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ABSTRACT 
MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION AND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH 
CONSEQUENCES OF "WHITE KNIGHT" BEHAVIOR 
MAY 1991 
AJEYO BANERJEE, B.Sc.(HONS), UNIVERSITY OF DELHI 
M.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF DELHI 
M.B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor James Owers 
This dissertation investigates the manager motivations 
involved in the participation of White Knights (WKs) in 
corporate control contests. The three features of WK bids, 
viz. (i) it is a subsequent bid , (ii) it is a friendly bid 
and (iii) it follows a hostile bid, combine uniquely to 
provide the context for varying bidding motivations of WK 
managers relative to the hostile bidders (HBs). An analysis 
of the sequence of bidding in these contests reveals a 
category called HHW WKs who make their bid after two 
consecutive bids by the HB, and tend to take relatively more 
time in doing so. The non-HHW WKs make their bid in 
relative haste after the first HB bid. Overpayments by WKs, 
for which statistical evidence is documented, are observed 
to be much more pervasive, and of considerably greater 
economic magnitudes, for non-HHW WKs. The managers of HHW 
WKs are thus more likely to be firm value maximizers; any 
observed overpayments could be the result of hubris or the 
winner's curse. However, the managers of non-HHW WKs may 
not be maximizing firm value through their bids, implying an 
absence of proper ex-ante incentive alignments for 
minimizing agency conflicts. These managers may thus have a 
lower proportion of annual expected income from their 
separate holdings of stock and stock options relative to 
their annual cash compensation (defined as variables COM and 
OP respectively). An examination of the structure of 
compensation packages of managers reveals that COM is lower 
for non-HHW WKs as compared to HHW WKs. OP is unable to 
directly distinguish between non-HHW WKs and HHW WKs. Yet, 
OP (as well as COM) are lower for non-HHW WKs relative to 
HBs. Further, neither COM nor OP is able to differentiate 
between HHW WKs and HBs. Thus, if HBs are considered as 
firm value maximizers, then HHW WKs are likely to be 
governed by similar motivations. In contrast, size 
maximization goals leading to higher proportions of cash 
compensation for their managers may dominate the acquisition 
activity of non-HHW WKs. External monitoring to limit 
agency conflicts, as proxied by relative debt levels, is 
also lower for non-HHW WKs. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Corporate Control Contests 
When a firm makes a hostile bid for a target firm with 
a tender offer at a premium over the market price, the 
ensuing contest is primarily one between the managers of the 
two firms for control of the target's assets. While the 
bidding firm is perceived to be motivated by possible future 
synergistic gains consistent with firm value maximization, 
the motives of the target managers in resisting the bid are 
not clear. On the one hand, by resisting the offer, target 
managers may be delaying the acquisition in order to attract 
higher bids for larger gains to its stockholders.1 On the 
other hand, their desire for retention of full control over 
the target firm's assets can dominate their obligation to 
find the best possible value for investment in the shares of 
their firm.2 
Both of these seemingly contradictory motivations of 
the target managers can be largely reconciled with the entry 
of a White Knight (WK) in the contest. The WK gets its name 
from its role in "rescuing" the target firm from the "evil" 
clutches of the hostile bidder (HB). The term 'White 
Knight' clearly implies that the WK bid is a friendly bid. 
Whether a WK is invited by the target into the bidding 
process or enters it of its own volition is not always 
clear. Yet, there is little doubt that such a bid enables 
the target managers to have the "best of both the worlds". 
These managers are likely to partially retain control 
because the WK takeover bid is friendly, and by definition, 
has been made with the consent of the target.3 The 
managers also fulfil their fiduciary duty by facilitating 
the payment of a substantial premium to their principals, 
the stockholders, since the WK has to bid a higher value for 
the target in order to succeed in making the acquisition. 
Though stockholders of the target may have suffered an 
opportunity loss in as much as other bidders are frightened 
away by the entry of the WK,4 this loss can never be 
directly ascertained. The empirical evidence will thus 
record only the realized gains of target stockholders in all 
bidding situations, as directly recorded by Black and 
Grundfest (1988), and detailed in the reviews of the merger 
studies conducted by Jensen and Ruback (1983), and Jarrell, 
Brickley and Netter (1988). 
Thus, faced with a hostile tender offer, the 
motivations of the target managers in inviting a WK to 
acquire their firm in a subsequent friendly bid seem clear. 
However, the motivations of the WK managers in making their 
bid are not that apparent. On the positive side, it is 
feasible that the WK managers are in the process of 
implementing a capital acquisition strategy for their firm. 
The besieged target is identified as one having the 
potential of additional gains because of the friendly nature 
2 
of the acquisition; this rationale will justify the premium 
over the pre-existing HB bid. Potential synergies can also 
motivate the desire of WK managers to establish a closer 
relationship with the target by obtaining a large equity 
stake in the firm in a friendly manner, without acquiring 
controlling interest.5 In these ex-ante situations, the WK 
managers act in their principals' best interest. 
However, there can also exist non firm-value maximizing 
manager motivations for the WK bid. The WK's late entry 
into the bidding process, made with relative haste after the 
first HB bid, may indicate a lack of careful scrutiny of the 
target. Also, there is no obvious explanation, consistent 
with stockholder wealth maximization, for the preference of 
WK managers to risk a contested bid instead of going in for 
a preemptive friendly bid (Lofthouse, 1984).6 As an 
example of possible non firm-value maximizing scenarios for 
WK bids, the WK manager may have access to "free" cash flow 
(Jensen, 1986) ,7 which can be used to make a WK acquisition 
which is a suboptimal investment. Alternatively, despite 
the non-firm value maximizing nature of the WK acquisition, 
the managers may be keen to increase their personal power 
through growth and higher turnovers (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1988, 1989). Another possibility can be the WK managers' 
implementation of their own antitakeover strategies. This 
will entail expanding to a level where the probability of a 
future HB bid against their firm becomes lower. Such a 
3 
strategy will further ensure that they retain their control 
over the firm's assets. Significantly, the common feature of 
all these alternatives is the non firm-value maximizing 
behavior on the part of the WK managers. 
The divergent motivations for WK bids are not 
inconsistent with reports of takeover activity in the 
summary studies by Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Jarrell, 
Brickley and Netter (1988), which do not find consistent 
results for bidders. There does, however, seem to be 
unanimity of opinion regarding the trends. 
When present, gains to bidders have never been large in 
percentage terms (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Some of 
the earlier studies found losses to bidders (Dodd, 
1980). 
Commencing with the conglomerate mergers of the 
sixties, there has been a trend toward negative bidder 
returns in the eighties (Jarrell, Brickley, & Netter, 
1988), and the losses have been found to be 
statistically significant (Black, 1989). 
The existence and extent of positive and negative 
bidder returns has been study specific, depending on 
the sample and event window examined. Roll (1986) has 
questioned the interpretability of the results for 
narrow event windows because of the possibility that 
the market reacts when acquisition strategies are 
announced by bidders prior to the bid rather than 
4 
during the announcement of the actual bid. 
The higher incidence of wealth reducing bids in the 
eighties has been ascribed to an increase in multiple 
bidding. In fact, first bidders who are successful 
continue to make gains and significant negative 
return reactions are observed in late bidder acquirers 
(Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1988). 
Typically, bidders have been found to be larger than 
targets. Therefore, the small positive bidder returns, 
where existing, have translated into large dollar gains 
comparable to dollar gains for targets (Dennis and 
McConnell, 1986). 
Since overpayment by bidders cannot be ruled out from 
the empirical evidence, researchers have attempted to 
ascertain the reasons for possible overpayment. This 
analysis is especially contextual for WKs, who are a subset 
of late bidders with additional target connected 
collaborative features. WKs are accordingly more likely to 
engage in overpayment and be responsible for negative bidder 
returns.8 
In the literature, there are rationalizations of 
overpayment by bidding firms' managers who are perceived to 
be faithful to the goal of firm value maximization. Roll 
(1986) contends that in their enthusiasm to acquire the 
target, managers of bidding firms may overpay due to hubris. 
In a slightly different vein, Varaiya and Ferris (1987) 
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posit that managers of bidding firms mistakenly overbid to 
increase the probability of their winning the contest 
because they are afflicted by the "winner's curse". Both 
these explanations give the benefit of the doubt to the 
bidding manager and are perfectly compatible with the 
complete alignment of manager-stockholder interests and the 
goal of firm value maximization. According to these 
rationales, the overpayment by the managers of the bidding 
firm is not deliberate. 
Other explanations of overpayment are not as charitable 
to the managers of bidding firms. Jensen (1986) mentions 
the availability of "free" cash flows as providing 
incentives to the managers to undertake suboptimal 
investments or bad acquisitions instead of distributing 
these funds to the stockholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1988) 
state that manager goals in acquisition may be quite 
different from stockholder goals. Managers pay additionally 
from the firm's cash flow for fulfilling their own goals 
which do not necessarily benefit stockholders; this is 
reflected as the overpayment in the stock price of the 
bidding firm. These theories are based on the premise that 
agency conflicts existing between managers and stockholders 
play out in value-decreasing acquisitions; thus overpayment 
by managers of bidding firms can be deliberate. 
If WK managers often overpay for the targets they 
acquire, we need to identify scenarios where the overpayment 
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is likely to be deliberate, and other situations where it is 
not. For the purpose, we follow a two pronged approach. 
First, we look for differences in the abnormal returns 
profiles of groups of WKs based upon certain characteristics 
of their bids. As we posit in the next section, such a 
partition of WKs can be based on their position in the 
sequence of bids for the target. 
Next, we seek to separate WKs into two groups: those 
WKs where the managers are motivated to maximize stockholder 
wealth, and other WKs where the managers are not so 
motivated. To this end, we make use of the principle that 
managers who do not act in a manner which maximizes firm 
value will be disciplined by the labor market; the threat of 
such a discipline is expected to act as a deterrence to 
aberrant manager behavior. We also know that on an ex-ante 
basis, such discipline can be imposed on managers through 
the use of stock based incentives in their compensation 
contracts. Systematic incentive related differences in the 
compensation contracts of WK managers can thus lead us to 
conclude that WKs whose managers have an effective incentive 
structure in their compensation contracts are more likely to 
be unintentional, rather than intentional overpayers. 
Based on the partition in the preceding paragraph, we 
neod to examine the compensation contracts of the relative 
managers to identity whether the overpayment by the wk 
managers is deliberate or not. Further, if this partition 
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is observed to be correlated with the partition of WKs based 
upon their position in the sequence of bids (which is 
posited to lead to differentiated abnormal returns 
profiles), we can directly identify unintentional overpayers 
from amongst WKs from the timing of their entry into the 
control contest reflected in the sequence of bids. The need 
to investigate compensation contracts will then become 
redundant, and manager motivations can be directly 
ascertained from the sequence of bids and abnormal return 
profiles. Overall, this study is expected to contribute 
significantly to the understanding of manager motivations in 
anticipating, initiating, and reacting to processes which 
intend to change existing control over corporate assets. 
1.2 The Study 
In order to accomplish our objectives, we have 
investigated the market reaction to WK stock prices in time 
intervals between the various bids of the HB and the WK in 
the context of the sequence of the different bids in control 
contests involving WKs. Our approach is based on the 
premise that in a firm value maximizing environment where 
the interests of the stockholder and the manager are 
completely aligned for all bidders, a bid (especially a late 
bid with greater chances of overpayment) requires a detailed 
appraisal of the value of the target to the bidder. Also, 
because of the timing of their entry, managers of potential 
late entry bidders may like to follow a cautious approach by 
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observing the playing out of the contest before moving in 
with their bid, if only to have additional information on 
the attractiveness of the target to the HB. One way to 
exhibit this caution will be to look for a higher bid by the 
HB when its first bid is rejected.9 Indeed, some WKs 
(called HHW WKs because their bid (W) comes after two HB 
bids (HH) from the same HB) do seem to act in this manner. 
Overpayment in their case is significantly lower than most 
other situations where the WKs enter the contest relatively 
quickly (compared to the HHW WKs) after the HB bid. Also, 
about one in every two HHW WKs has a positive abnormal 
return during the bid. However, only one in seven White 
Knights has a positive abnormal return during their bid if 
they do not display the HHW feature. The returns profile 
for the HHW WKs thus seem to be similar to the overall 
returns profile of bidding firms from other studies? this is 
not the case with the returns profile of the non-HHW WKs. 
The above indications lead us to suggest that managers 
of HHW WKs are more likely to be firm value maximizers. 
Even if they do end up overpaying, it is unlikely to be 
intentional. In contrast, managers of the non-HHW WKs are 
more likely to have anticipated overpayment or initiated a 
downward revision in the market's expectations of the firm's 
future cash flows. 
Our view in this regard is reinforced when we 
investigate a third type of bidding sequence called 
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Alternating Sequential Bidding (ASBs). For most WKs, their 
only bid is the successful bid. However, for some (who are 
not HHW WKs), the HB comes back with a higher bid after the 
WK's first bid. In all these cases, the WK continues to 
overbid until it succeeds in acquiring the target. More 
importantly, each of the subsequent WK bids is additionally 
value reducing in contrast to subsequent HB bids which have 
no impact on the stock price of the HB. 
The partition of the WKs based on their position in the 
bidding sequence gives a reasoned indication that the non- 
HHW group of WKs is more likely to be an intentional 
overpayer. More directly, an intentional overpayer is 
unlikely to be a firm value maximizer. If a manager 
overpays deliberately and yet survives, we suggest that the 
various market mechanisms available to discipline such 
managers (stated below) must be ineffectual. The available 
disciplinary measures of the market are as follows: 
External Mechanisms 
Managerial labor market. 
Hostile tender offer. 
Internal Mechanisms 
- Structure of managerial compensation packages. 
10 
If the external mechanisms (outlined above) are 
effective, then managers of WK firms who are considered to 
be involved in non firm value maximizing activity can expect 
to be disciplined through the managerial labor market or 
through a hostile takeover bid for the WK. However, there 
is little empirical evidence of efficiency in the managerial 
labor market, primarily because valuation of the intangible 
human capital of managers is very difficult. Disciplining 
through hostile tender offers may also not be effective,10 
because the WK acquisition strategy can itself play the role 
of an antitakeover device and avoid the disciplining 
mechanism of hostile takeovers in the future. A successful 
WK acquisition, by increasing size, makes it less likely 
(from the resource standpoint) that the WK will be the 
subject of a future HB bid. 
On the internal side, the disciplining mechanism works 
through the stockholders opting to align the interests of 
their managers with themselves by providing suitable 
incentives in the managerial compensation packages so as to 
minimize aberrant manager behavior. There is a large body of 
literature (reviewed in chapter 2) originating from 
financial economics, accounting, and management which 
collectively demonstrates that managerial ownership of stock 
and stock options helps to reduce agency conflicts, aligns 
the interests of managers and stockholders, and even 
favorably affects investment and financing decisions. We 
11 
posit, then, that managers who do not have such incentives 
on an ex-ante basis are more likely to perform in a non firm 
value maximizing way (and the converse also holds true), and 
this can be examined ex-post in the case of WKs. If the 
proposed acquisition by the WK leads to a maximization of 
the manager's own utility function, then he/she can end up 
being an intentional overpayer. The non firm value 
maximizing behavior may be at little personal cost to the 
manager because of the inadequate alignment of incentives in 
the compensation package. Additionally, there may be 
personal benefits in the form of "entrenchment" through 
acquisition (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). In this 
connection, the existence of leverage can also lead to the 
institution of internal monitoring mechanisms through bond 
indentures. These can restrict the amount of "free" cash 
flow available to managers, and be a general disincentive to 
non firm-value maximizing actions by the managers of the WK 
firms. 
There are no absolute standards for the proportion of 
stock and stock options in compensation packages which will 
completely eliminate agency conflicts. However, we consider 
whether the incidence of stock and stock options in 
compensation packages are significantly higher in the case 
of the HBs and HHW WKs where interests of stockholders and 
managers seem to be more aligned, when contrasted with the 
managers of non-HHW WKs. If such a hypothesis is 
12 
empirically well-founded, it will support our original 
contention that managers of HHW WKs are more likely to be 
value maximizers pursuing strategies supportive of the 
objectives of the firm. In contrast, managers of non-HHW 
WKs will possibly exhibit non-value maximizing behavior when 
making their bid. 
In conducting our study on the extent of managerial 
ownership in compensation packages, we separately consider 
stock options. Stock options are usually ignored in the 
compensation literature because of difficulties in 
valuation. Also, stock options have undergone a large 
number of changes over the years discouraging meaningful 
inter-year comparisons. Another reason for historically 
excluding stock options is the tax benefit of these options 
to the firm and the manager which dominated any incentive 
effects (Miller and Scholes, 1981). In our comparison of the 
proportion of stock and stock options to total compensation, 
both the groups (HB and WK) appear in the same time frame of 
the control contests. As such, tax consequences, or changes 
in the nature of the option plans, are not likely to have 
any intertemporal marginal effects. Our approach to the 
valuation stock options is laid out in chapter 4. 
The structure of the rest of the dissertation is as 
follows. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature in 
detail. Chapter 3 explains the bidding situations regarding 
the WK bids and defines the various hypotheses of the study. 
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Chapter 4 provides details of the data and methodology. 
Chapter 5 discusses both the results of testing the 
hypotheses regarding bidding behavior, and their 
implications for managerial motivation. Chapter 5 further 
discusses the results of testing the hypothesis relating to 
managerial motivation. Chapter 6 provides a summary of the 
findings and reviews the contribution of the study. 
14 
ENDNOTES 
1. Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) state that "the ... 
benefit of resistance comes when resistance by target 
management helps promote a takeover auction. ... This 
auction rationale for resistance is harder to reject 
statistically." - p 58. 
2. Dann and DeAngelo (1988), in a study of antitakeover 
defenses launched by target firms in response to 
hostile bids (responsive restructuring), find that 
such strategies were generally detrimental to the 
stockholder wealth of targets, presumably because of 
the managerial control retention features involved. 
However, a successful takeover by the hostile bidder or 
a competing bidder results in a wealth gain for target 
stockholders. 
3. The role, if any, of investment bankers in bringing the 
managers of the WK and the target together does not 
vitiate the basic premises of the situation. 
4. The theoretical model of Shleifer and Vishny (1986), 
discussed in chapter 2, is based on such a scenario. 
5. In this situation, the subsequent friendly bidder is 
called a White Squire to distinguish it from a White 
Knight who would seek to acquire controlling interest 
in the target firm. A White Squire participates in the 
antitakeover maneuver of the target firm to deter the 
HB from pursuing its bid any further, while enabling 
the target firm to retain its independent existence. 
Since White Squires do not commit themselves to acquire 
the target, valuation consequences of their bids are 
likely to be different from those of other similarly 
placed firms who do seek to exercise complete control 
over the target through acquisition, viz. White 
Knights. 
6. We do not rule out the possibility of premiums offered 
in friendly WK bids being of the same magnitude as 
those offered in preemptive friendly mergers. This 
situation presupposes that potential synergistic gains 
to the hostile bidder (HB) are considerably lower than 
those (gains) to the WK. Thus, the WK can effectively 
ignore the prior bid of the HB, and the HB has no scope 
of topping the WK bid. However, such wide disparities 
in valuations are relatively unlikely. Also, in such a 
situation, since the target is already in play, the WK 
in the firm value maximization mode may prefer not to 
'give away' the entire gains to the target. 
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7. These are surplus, unrestrained (by bond indentures) 
cash flows under the control of managers, which are not 
distributed to shareholders despite the absence of 
positive net present value avenues of investment. 
8. Negative bidder returns during the event period 
represent overpayment because they may be assumed to 
cause an equivalent downward revision in the 
expectations of future cash flow due to the event in 
the event time methodology framework. 
9. The HB, which is presumed to have thoroughly evaluated 
the target firm, usually decides upon a range over 
which it will bid. If it makes more than one bid, a 
better estimate is likely to be available of the upper 
end of the range. If it does not, the first bid may be 
perceived to have largely exhausted the range. Because 
of the costs incurred in assessing the target, the HB 
would probably come back with another bid if it could 
do so within its predetermined range. 
10. The issue is addressed by Mitchell and Lehn (1990). 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
In this survey, we review some representative papers 
with a key bearing on the issues relevant to our study. 
Since we initially use cumulative abnormal returns of 
bidders under the market model (explained in detail in 
chapter 4) for providing support to our hypotheses, we start 
the survey by briefly reviewing the history of research on 
cumulative abnormal returns of bidding firms. 
2.1 Bidder Returns in Merger Studies 
As Jensen and Ruback (1983) aptly summarize, research 
on mergers has conclusively shown that the shareholders of 
target firms obtain significantly positive abnormal returns 
as a result of successful takeover activity.1 However, 
this outcome for targets has not been duplicated for 
stockholders of bidding firms, who do not get significantly 
large and positive abnormal returns during their bid. 
Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988) have stratified the 
sample of bidding firms by decade, and reported that 
significant positive excess returns for bidding firms in the 
1960s and the 1970s (Jensen and Ruback, 1983) have been 
replaced by insignificant negative excess returns to bidders 
in the 1980s. Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) seek to explain 
the phenomenon of insignificant average bidder returns 
through the increased incidence of multiple bids in the 
1980s. However, as Roll (1988) mentions, it has never 
become quite clear why the gains from mergers shall accrue 
so overwhelmingly (at least in percentage terms) to targets 
instead of being more equitably divided between bidders and 
targets.2 
Black (1989) summarizes all studies on bidder returns 
in 1987 and 1988,3 and finds a preponderance of negative 
abnormal returns to bidders over a short event window of one 
to four days, as well as over longer event windows. It is 
certainly possible that over the decades, a structural 
change has been occurring in bidder performance during 
takeover bids, putting increasing pressure on the already 
slim share of takeover gains in the first place, and in some 
cases, perhaps wiping out gains altogether. Hostile bids, 
ushered in 1974,4 caused increased competition for takeover 
of target firms through multiple bids. Additionally, as 
Black (1989) conjectures, the greater induction of private 
bidders in the 1980s due to an increased incidence of 
leveraged buyouts and management buyouts etc. can 
potentially affect the studies covering this period with a 
selection bias, since private bidders are excluded from 
these studies for data considerations. 
If we accept Roll's (1986) view, the outcome of long¬ 
term strategy implementation by bidders is reflected in 
bids. These bids are therefore likely to be anticipated by 
the market. Market reaction may thus be forthcoming only to 
information regarding the prospective strategy, and not to 
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the actual implementation of the strategy effected through 
bids. Additionally, the partially anticipated nature of the 
event (Schipper and Thomson, 1983) makes the event study 
with insufficiently large windows prior to the bid an 
inadequate tool to measure the impact of the event through 
an estimation of the relative abnormal return.5 Because of 
these two factors unique to bidder returns viz. the gap 
between the formulation and implementation of strategy and 
the partially anticipated nature of the event, there is the 
risk of making incorrect inferences from the event-related 
returns. 
In a discussion of the wide variation in the evidence 
regarding bidder returns. Roll (1988) states that "depending 
on the paper, the sample, the period, and the biases of the 
reader, widely differing conclusions can be reached." The 
evidence, while seeming to be at a dead end, also indicates 
an opportunity if it is perceived to imply that there exist 
subsets of bidders which, while differing among themselves 
in the pattern of abnormal returns during takeover bids 
(leading to the mixed evidence), exhibit considerably more 
homogeneity within each individual subset. Some of these 
subsets will have to exhibit negative abnormal returns 
representing overpayment more pervasively for the overall 
average for bidders to correspond to the documented 
evidence. 
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Existing research shows progress in identifying the 
characteristics of some such subsets. Tehranian, Travlos & 
Waegelein (1987) demonstrate that firms with long-term 
performance linked compensation plans are likely to 
experience a more favorable market reaction to their 
acquisition proposals. The possibility of a negative 
abnormal return for bidders increases with stock financing 
of acquisitions (Travlos, 1987) and low managerial ownership 
(Amihud, Lev and Travlos, 1990). Lang, Stulz and Walkling 
(1989) document evidence that bidders with poor abnormal 
returns have a low Tobin's Q6 (a proxy for firm 
performance). Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) state that 
abnormal returns exhibited by bidding firms are lower when 
they diversify or look for a rapidly growing target, or when 
the performance of their managers prior to the acquisition 
is considered to be poor. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) show 
that the abnormal returns to the bidder are lower (the 
bidder has to pay a higher premium) if the size of the 
target is smaller relative to the bidder. 
2.2 Reasons for Possible Overpayment by Bidders 
Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) ascribe the change 
in the direction of abnormal bidder returns in the 1980s to 
the increased incidence of multiple bidding which lead to 
higher target premiums, and, as a consequence, lower bidder 
returns. According to them, multiple bidding has been 
encouraged in the 1980s by disclosure and delay rules 
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imposed by Federal and State regulations, court rulings 
protecting defensive tactics, the invention of new defenses 
against takeovers (like 'fair price amendments' and 'poison 
pills'), and the presence of sophisticated takeover advisers 
to implement the defenses. However, none of these reasons 
explain why the abnormal return for the bidder will be 
negative. 
Roll (1986) and Varaiya and Ferris (1987) offer 
rationales for unintentional overpayment by bidders in 
tender offers.7 Roll's theory is based on manager optimism 
and uncertainty about value. In his analysis, the existence 
of an active market in the item being valued makes takeover 
bids different from other types of bids where there is a 
symmetry between the buyer and seller regarding valuation. 
Because the value of the target is uncertain, the valuation 
of the bidders is likely to be distributed in a manner such 
that the expected value is the current market price of the 
target. However, since no bid is made if the valuation is 
below the market price of the target, samples of bidding 
situations are not random and represent positive errors in 
valuation. Thus, there remains a high probability of 
overpayment even if markets are strong-form efficient. Yet, 
when making their bids, managers seem to be afflicted with 
excessive optimism or hubris in presuming that their bid is 
a fair bid. 
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Varaiya and Ferris (1987) base their reasoning on 
manager ignorance and the "winner's curse". Their analysis 
is also based on wide fluctuations in valuation of the 
target. The "winner's curse" hypothesis (Capen, Clapp and 
Campbell, 1971) states that in any bidding situation where 
the value of the object being bid for is uncertain, a party 
that unknowingly overestimates the value of a given object 
tends to bid higher than its competitors, and is thus more 
likely to win it. Mathematically, Oren and Williams (1975) 
have shown that when the winning bidder's estimates are 
correct on average, the estimated expected value of the 
object won is greater than its ultimate expected value. 
Thus, in a takeover bidding situation, the winner tends to 
be the bidder who most overestimates the value of the 
target. Although this approach is similar to Roll's hubris 
theory, the winner's curse approach emphasizes the higher 
probability of success when the value of the target is 
overestimated. 
An alternative explanation of bidder behavior can be 
intentional non-value maximizing behavior by managers of the 
bidding firm. There are at least two theories in this 
regard, arising out of agency conflicts between managers and 
stockholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1988, 1989) state that 
managers may display such conduct due to their strong 
preference for the status-quo, and promote self-entrenchment 
by investing in businesses they are presently running, 
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irrespective of the effect the acquisition may have on the 
value of the firm.8 In these cases, managers do not 
overpay because they make mistakes out of ignorance 
(winner's curse) or enthusiasm (hubris). Rather, they make 
an overpayment for the benefits of the acquisition that they 
care about but the shareholders do not e.g. increasing the 
size of the firm, diversifying the firm to minimize their 
employment risk, making themselves less replaceable etc. 
Jensen's (1986) theory of free cash flow suggests that 
managers of firms having access to unrestricted excess cash 
flows (due to the absence of positive net present value 
projects) manifest their divergence of interests with the 
stockholders by making value reducing acquisitions instead 
of distributing the excess cash to the stockholders. 
2.3 White Knight (WK) Behavior 
2.3.1 Theoretical Studies 
Giammarino and Heinkel (1986) have constructed a 
theoretical model of dynamic takeover behavior based upon 
asymmetric information among participants regarding the 
synergy gain from the takeover. Here, the first bidder, 
called the ''informed'' bidder, possesses potentially superior 
information about the synergistic gains, which is not 
available to the target or another "uninformed" bidder 
(here) called the WK. To overcome the informational 
disadvantage, the WK is structured with some tactical 
advantages so that it can enter the bidding and impose 
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competitive discipline on the informed bidder. These 
advantages accrue from specific sequential structures 
imposed by the model on the bidding process. In particular, 
the WK is aware of the information set of signals of the 
informed bidder and it is accorded the privilege of making 
the last bid. The model has, as one of the equilibrium 
consequences, potential overpayment by the "uninformed" WK 
in acquiring the target at a cost in excess of the realized 
synergy gains. However, the model is based upon sequential 
bidding where no single bidder can successively bid more 
than once. This does not always occur in multiple bidding 
situations for corporate acquisitions. Besides, the model 
compels the WK to bid last to compensate for informational 
asymmetry; it further assumes that the extent of synergy 
gain is common to all bidders, which is unlikely to be valid 
in reality. 
In contrast, the sequential bidding model of Shleifer 
and Vishny (1986b) models the WK as an antitakeover defense 
and provides a rationale for payment of "greenmail" in the 
context of target shareholder value maximization. In their 
model, the target's access to the WK is the only source of 
asymmetric information between the parties in the takeover 
contest. They posit that the presumption of the existence 
of a WK makes potential subsequent bidders shy away from a 
control contest. The WKs' entry into the contest is 
controlled, to some extent, by the target's managers who 
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possess private information about the source of gains from a 
takeover by the WK. The WK can thus have synergistic gains 
only if the cooperation of the target management is 
available. The information regarding the inability of the 
target managers to identify a WK is a signal which is 
revealed to the market (and to other potential bidders) 
through payment of "greenmail” to the HB. Other prospective 
bidders are thus no longer deterred by the possible 
existence of a WK, and incur costs to acquire information to 
make higher bids for the target. Thus, if the target feels 
that the first bidder's bid is not adequate, and other 
bidders are not incurring costs of acquiring information and 
coming forward to bid because they apprehend that a WK is 
waiting in the wings, then the target will either inform the 
market of the absence of a WK or conceal the WK's existence 
by paying "greenmail", thereby encouraging other bidders to 
bid. Otherwise, only the first bidder and the WK will 
participate in the auction process. In this model, the WK is 
not structured to overpay due to the existence of specific 
potential synergies in a WK acquisition. Also, hostile 
tender offers can result in one of two scenarios: the 
payment of "greenmail" followed by further bids, or 
acquisition by a WK. The analysis is not exhaustive since a 
number of hostile tender offers have resulted in the 
acquisition of the target firm without payment of 
"greenmail" or WK intervention. 
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Both of the models discussed above assume that managers 
act in the best interests of the respective stockholders. 
Yet, this may not necessarily be true in the light of agency 
conflicts between managers and stockholders. 
2.3.2 Empirical Studies 
There has been only one published study till now which 
explicitly deals with White Knights (WKs). Smiley and 
Stewart (1985) look at a sample of 44 tender offers over the 
period 1972-1978 that involve WKs. They conclude that WKs, 
as a group, do not earn significant abnormal returns before 
or after a tender offer. Firms that choose to become WKs in 
contested takeover bids come from different industries but 
have substantially higher leverage and lower cash turnover 
than other control firms. Unlike WKs that fail, WKs that 
succeed systematically belong to industries that have 
performed better in the previous five years. There is some 
indication that faced with poor industry performance, WKs 
seek to diversify out of the industry. Smiley and Stewart do 
not state either their sources or the criteria used for 
their sample of WKs. By inference, their WKs seem to be 
second bidders who are inducted by investment bankers into 
the takeover battle, independent of final outcome. The 
authors also use monthly data in an event study framework, 
which makes it considerably more difficult to capture firm 
specific events and interpret the effect of the dynamic 
market processes pertaining to these contests. 
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Mikkelson and Ruback (1985a), in a study of the 
interfirm equity investment process, document additional 
positive abnormal returns to shareholders of first bidders 
on subsequent bids by "third parties" which will presumably 
also flow to the shareholders of the target. Though not 
explicitly identified as such, WK bids will be a subset of 
such subsequent bids by "third parties". 
Bradley, Desai and Kim (BDK - 1988) implicitly deal 
with White Knights while focussing on multiple-bidder 
contests in their study of all successful tender offer 
contests between 1963 and 1984.9 They observe that 
successful tender offers increase the combined value of 
targets and acquiring firms by 7.4%. Competition among 
bidding firms increase the returns to targets and decrease 
the return to acquirers. Unlike the single bid acquirers, 
multiple bid acquirers do not seem to earn significant 
positive cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the event 
date, especially in the eighties. BDK (1988) ascribe these 
results for multiple bid acquirers to the laissez-faire 
policies of the federal government, the introduction of 
sophisticated antitakeover tactics, and the proliferation of 
investment banking firms which specialized in raising funds 
to finance takeovers. 
On further investigation, BDK (1988) find that the 
insignificant positive abnormal returns or negative abnormal 
returns earned by multiple bidder acquirers can be ascribed 
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to the significant negative CARs earned by "late bidder 
acquirers, more commonly known as white knights."10 This 
feature is contrasted to first bidder acquirers in multiple 
bid contests, who earn a significant positive CAR. It is 
our view that the WK nature of a bid is not fully captured 
by categorizing all late bidder acquirers as WKs. Our 
definition of a WK bid, defined and explained at the 
beginning of Chapter 4, is considered to be more 
representative of this category of bids. 
2.4 Agency Theory and Negative Bidder Returns 
Negative price reactions to acquirer bids do not, in 
themselves, have to reflect conflict of interest. Such 
reactions can be explained by errors or differences of 
opinion between managers with inside information and 
stockholders without such information. This asymmetry of 
information between managers and stockholders results from 
delegation of authority (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985). 
Besides, a fall in stock price does not necessarily indicate 
that the manager benefitted. On the contrary, the manager 
may also have suffered through stock ownership, in which 
case there will actually be an alignment of interests. An 
effective compensation plan, if successful in aligning 
interests, will require a movement in the same direction for 
both the change in the stock price and the change in the 
compensation. 
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However, if the wealth reducing acquisitions of some 
bidders, especially late bidders like WKs, are indeed a 
reflection of deliberate non firm-value maximizing behavior 
of their managers, a possible reason can be the inability of 
available mechanisms to reduce agency conflicts and align 
the interests of the managers with those of their 
stockholders. In this regard, Mikkelson and Ruback (1985b) 
mention that the following mechanisms are available to limit 
management from pursuing its self-interest: 
Efficient functioning of the managerial labor market. 
Hostile tender offer in the market for corporate 
control. 
Compensation package aligning the interests of the 
stockholders and managers. 
The efficient managerial labor market theory (Fama, 1980) 
states that there exists an efficient market for executives. 
Any action initiated by managers and perceived to be non 
firm value maximizing promptly reduces the value of the 
managers in the marketplace. However, Dyl (1988) shows that 
better internal monitoring, rather than the existence of an 
external managerial labor market, limits the pursuit of 
self-interest by managers. The efficacy of the hostile 
tender offer is difficult to anticipate ex-ante. Mitchell 
and Lehn (1990) posit that there is a stronger likelihood 
that bidders in value reducing acquisitions become targets 
of hostile bids in future. However, the empirical evidence 
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in this regard is not conclusive with a large number of 
value reducing acquirers remaining as nontargets, possibly 
because a part of managerial self-interest also consists of 
making the firm unattractive as a takeover target. 
2.5 Manager Motivation Through Compensation 
As stated above, one of the ways to limit agency 
conflict is to design appropriate compensation packages for 
manager motivation and the alignment of manager-stockholder 
interests. As Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) point out, 
compensation packages based exclusively on stock price 
performance are inefficient methods for compensating risk- 
averse executives, since stock price variation can be caused 
by systematic risk factors outside the executives' control. 
Risk averse executives will demand compensation premiums to 
neutralize the wide fluctuations in compensation that is 
caused by these events. On the other hand, the introduction 
of stock purchase plans, though yielding positive abnormal 
returns, may not be interpreted as being exclusively due to 
a change in contracting which results in a better alignment 
of manager stockholder interests (Bhagat, Brickley and 
Lease, 1985). The same phenomenon can, as well, be 
explained as a signal of the management indicating better 
future performance. 
In the management literature (Kerr and Bettis, 1987; 
Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989), 
a distinction is made between owner-controlled firms where a 
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dominant stockholder controls more than 5% of the stock, and 
management-controlled firms where stock ownership is 
dispersed. Manager-owned firms are a subset of owner- 
controlled firms where management holds more than 5% of the 
stock and is thus one of the dominant stockholders. The 
owner in owner-controlled firms views the firm as an 
investment and has the power and the incentive to reduce 
agency conflict by aligning compensation of the managers to 
performance of the firms. As such, executives in these 
firms receive more compensation for performance and less for 
the scale of operation than managers in management- 
controlled firms. Managers in owner-controlled firms thus 
have to bear more compensation risk. There is a decoupling 
of pay from performance for management controlled firms. 
2.5.1 Compensation Structures 
The literature relating to determinants of managerial 
compensation is extensive, stretching across practically all 
disciplines in the social sciences. At the outset, we note 
that a large number of studies have shown a strong 
econometric association between firm size and managerial 
compensation, presumably because executives of bigger firms 
oversee more resources, large firms have more ability to 
pay, and there are more hierarchical layers in large firms 
(Ciscel and Carroll, 1980). However, we are more concerned 
here with the determinants of managerial compensation in so 
far as they motivate managerial incentive issues through 
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ownership of common stock and stock options. As Miller and 
Scholes (1981) point out in their study of the tax incentive 
effects of compensation plans, compensation solely in the 
form of the firm's stock can make managers less willing to 
undertake risky investments than the stockholders wish, as 
the managers will have to carry the total risk instead of 
only the undiversifiable risk carried by the stockholders. 
In contrast, a manager's incentives to adopt very risky 
policies that stockholders are likely to reject will 
obviously increase if compensation is solely in options in 
the firm's shares than in the shares themselves. 
Lewellen, Loderer and Martin (LLM - 1987) conduct an 
interesting study seeking to link managerial decisions with 
the structure of managerial pay. They highlight different 
dimensions of the agency conflict and posit that varying 
incentive features in compensation contracts are motivated 
by the need to solve diverse aspects of owner-manager 
conflicts of interest. Thus, instead of a formal model of 
compensation design, they look for the detection of 
empirical regularities in compensation structures that can 
assist in explaining owner-manager agency relationship. 
According to LLM (1987), the two issues in the agency 
problem of the manager are the time horizon problem (viz. 
that the executive does not have an infinite time horizon 
like the stockholder) and the risk exposure problem (viz. 
finding an optimal allocation of risk sharing between 
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managers and stockholders). Deferred compensation can 
ameliorate the limited horizon problem of the managers; yet 
it can simultaneously increase their risk exposure by 
increasing the share of managerial wealth tied to the future 
financial health of the firm. 
LLM (1987) contend that stock based pay, which is a 
variable claim on the firm's cash flows, can deal with the 
twin problems of underleveraging and underinvestment. If 
managers have a fixed claim on the firm's cash flows, they 
might tend to favor a lower level of indebtedness for the 
firm since debt will compete with their claims to the same 
lower tail of the firm's cash flow distribution. Also, if 
fixed income claims of the firm's managers predominate, and 
the firm's bankruptcy risk is non-zero, the managers may 
favor investment policies which reduce the variance of firm 
value to reduce the personal risks they bear - even if those 
policies lower the firm value. In contrast, through stock 
based pay, managers have title to part of the residual after 
fixed claims have been met. Potential underleverage 
tendencies of management are thus addressed. Stock based 
compensation also does not provide the incentive to managers 
to undertake investments that decrease share prices. 
Further, if the firm is levered, such compensation to 
managers will raise the payoff from variance-increasing 
investments. 
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However, unlike other market investors, managers cannot 
easily diversify away the diversifiable risk of the firm 
under their management. Their stock-related compensation 
claims, together with direct holdings of the common shares 
of their companies, are likely to represent a substantial 
portion of their personal wealth. Therefore, increasing the 
percentage of stock-related compensation may actually make 
management more reluctant to choose high variance investment 
projects because a higher proportion of stock in their 
compensation adds to their risk exposure. In principle, 
executives can counterbalance this effect by reducing their 
existing holding of the firm's shares but this may be 
considered as a bad signal by the market. Further, managers 
may be prohibited by their contracts from selling off their 
holdings of the firm's stock before a predetermined time 
interval. Capital gains realizations can further inhibit 
portfolio rebalancing by managers. Managers will thus bear 
increased firm specific risk as emphasis on stock related 
forms of compensation rises. 
LLM treat the problem of risk exposure as an empirical 
issue and find that the incentive effects of higher variance 
of stock returns and higher levels of debt overwhelm the 
increased personal portfolio risk exposure (diversifiable) 
of the manager. Empirical evidence reveals that stock based 
pay effectively prevents excessively conservative investment 
policies. 
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Jensen and Murphy (1990) investigate the influence of 
compensation in aligning manager-stockholder interests by 
estimating the extent to which compensation policy in the 
form of performance based bonuses, salary revisions and 
stock options actually provides value increasing incentives 
to managers. They find that on average, an increase of 
$1000 in shareholder wealth results in an increase of only 
$3.25 in the wealth of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). 
This empirical relation, while positive and significant, is 
considered small for an occupation where incentive 
remuneration is expected to play an important role, and is 
thus inconsistent with the formal agency model of optimal 
contracting. Such a model postulates that a risk neutral 
executive has incentives to pursue stockholder wealth 
maximizing activities only when he/she gets 100% of the 
marginal surpluses arising out of such activity. However, 
pay-performance contracts in conformity with this model are 
not feasible since executives with limited resources cannot 
credibly commit to pay firms for large negative realizations 
of firm performance, and shareholders cannot credibly commit 
to huge bonuses that amount to giving away the firm. 
In actual practice, the managers are not risk neutral, 
and their costs of bearing risk are considerably higher than 
those of widely diffused shareholders holding well- 
diversified portfolios. Thus, requiring these risk-averse 
executives to take actions which will enable them to get 
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100% of the marginal profits in risky projects (in terms of 
an optimal agency model of incentive contracting) subjects 
them to unacceptably large risks. On the contrary, if the 
primacy among firm goals is shifted from stockholder wealth 
maximization to efficient risk sharing by way of transfer of 
risk from managers to stockholders, then executives can be 
given contracts where they will get only a fraction of the 
marginal surpluses arising out of their performance. But 
this will generate agency costs because the executive 
incentives for performance will become poorer. Optimal 
compensation contracts need to reflect the trade off between 
the goals of providing efficient risk-sharing and providing 
the CEO with incentives to take appropriate actions. 
Though agency models seem to be unable to explain the 
observed small pay-performance sensitivity, executives 
remain important agents, and incentives are important for 
them. Jensen and Murphy suggest an alternative hypothesis 
to explain the observed pay-performance relationship for 
executives. Their hypothesis states that political forces 
operating in both the public sector and inside organizations 
limit large payoffs for exceptional performance. Truncating 
the upper tail of the payoff distribution requires that the 
lower tail of the distribution also be truncated to maintain 
levels of compensation consistent with equilibrium in the 
managerial labor market. This implicit regulation of 
executive compensation is the reason for the declines in the 
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pay- performance relations since the 1930s. Jensen and 
Murphy also find that the relation between compensation and 
ownership is independent of insider stock ownership. 
In the economics literature, the inability of agency 
theory to explain the high levels of CEO compensation has 
given rise to the determination of the value of this 
compensation as a tournament (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Rosen, 
1986). Here, executive salary structures are likened to a 
series of tournaments or lotteries among contestants. 
Winners of the tournament at a lower level in the executive 
ladder are allowed to enter the next tournament at the 
following higher level. The compensation of the CEO is the 
prize in the lottery; so those below this level give up some 
of their earnings to be put into the prize for which they 
will all compete. Difficulties in monitoring executive 
effort (the principal-agent problem) and the tendency for 
employees to be more risk-averse than firms combine to make 
such lottery arrangements preferable under certain 
conditions. This provides the theoretical justification for 
the large difference between CEO salary and that of other 
executives at the immediately lower level. The social 
comparison theory (O'Reilly, Main, & Crystal, 1988) 
originates out of psychology. The theory is based on the 
observation that CEO salaries are determined by the 
compensation committee of the Board of Directors. The 
members of this committee are often outside directors 
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holding CEO positions in other firms. As such, it is 
possible that a social comparison process operates between 
the various CEOs sitting on the Board, with the compensation 
of the firm's CEO being determined in part through a 
comparison process by the compensation committee members. 
Since the CEO exerts informal influence in selecting new 
board members, the selection process itself can raise the 
CEO compensation. 
There is an increased awareness in the literature that 
it is difficult to model entire compensation packages, and 
it might be more fruitful to look at the determinants and 
consequences of the type and mix of these packages 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1988). 
2.5.2 Managerial Ownership of Stock 
Lewellen, Loderer and Rosenfeld (LLR - 1985) attempt to 
relate the personal wealth circumstances of managers to the 
stock returns to bidders. They state that the possible 
incentive effects of mergers arise out of stock ownership, 
and mergers cannot be intentionally wealth reducing. In 
fact, stock ownership is an important means for inducing and 
bonding managers to act in the interest of shareholders 
(Bentson, 1985). But if the manager does not own stock, the 
primary incentive for a merger will be to reduce the 
variance of managerial compensation possibly leading to 
value-reducing acquisitions. LLR (1985) conclude from their 
analysis that if one observes non-random negative abnormal 
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stock price performance by the bidder ex-post, one can 
infer, with a fair degree of certainty, that the merger 
which produced that result is not initiated by a firm whose 
managers have large own-company holdings. In fact, low 
ownership creates its own set of incentives which cannot be 
offset by contractual arrangements and competition in the 
managerial labor market. However, the paper does not 
conclusively show that investment decisions differ 
systematically between firms with high and low management 
ownership of common stock. There is also no direct evidence 
that mergers with negative stock returns represent conflict 
of interest. 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (MSV - 1988) carry out a 
detailed study of the relationship between management 
ownership and firm valuation arising out of management 
performance. According to them, as management ownership 
rises, there is a reduction in the agency costs to the firm 
due to the deviation of managers from firm value 
maximization. This convergence of interest hypothesis 
implies that market value increases with management 
ownership. Conversely, with large ownership, managers can 
indulge in non-value maximizing behavior without worrying 
about market control features like managerial labor market, 
product market, or hostile takeover market. This is named 
the entrenchment hypothesis. 
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Using Tobin's Q to measure market valuation, MSV (1988) 
observe a non-linear relationship between manager ownership 
and firm value. Between 0% and 5% ownership, the value of Q 
rises. This seems to support the convergence of interests 
hypothesis. However, the fact that managers of large Q firms 
have more stock can also be explained by other reasons. For 
example, the manager's stock position can come from 
remuneration, and firms that do well are more likely to give 
managers stock bonuses or have managers exercise their stock 
options. Also, if the entrepreneurial ability or a money¬ 
making idea of top management is rewarded with a higher 
equity stake in the firm, firms with a lot of such 
intangible assets will have a higher Q and higher ownership. 
Further, firms with high Q may require a higher ownership 
for proper management of assets. Besides, managers expecting 
high future profits might retain higher stakes. The 
retention of higher stakes by the management then conveys a 
positive signal to the market and results in a higher stock 
price. In addition, firms with a young capital stock might 
have a higher measured Q than older firms, and might also 
have higher management ownership, since less time has passed 
for initial stakes to get dissipated. 
If management ownership falls in the 5% to 25% range, 
entrenchment seems to dominate incentives, since the Tobin's 
Q falls as manager ownership rises. The entrenchment can be 
due to the status of the manager as founder, enhanced voting 
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power, increased tenure with and attachment to the firm, 
lower employment of professional managers, and dominance of 
insider directors on the board. According to MSV, the 
negative effect of higher manager ownership on Q is not an 
indicator of inefficiency and may reflect the optimal trade¬ 
off between profits and private benefits to the management 
from non value-maximizing behavior. Though it seems that 
non value-maximizing behavior is more prevalent in 
corporations in which management has greater effective 
control, these may also be the firms in which management's 
private benefits of control are the greatest. The higher 
level of non-value maximizing behavior in these firms then 
simply reflects the fact that management values such 
behavior more and therefore the efficient level of such 
behavior is higher. Simultaneously, there are probably 
severe limitations on executive pay and the degree to which 
management can be bribed to take particular actions. Without 
side payments, corporate decisions will not necessarily 
maximize the sum of cash flows and private benefits to 
management because the party with effective control will 
make corporate decisions according to his/her personal 
preferences. 
When manager ownership reaches 25%, Tobin's Q again 
increases with manager ownership, revealing that the 
management is totally entrenched and free of outside 
challenge, so incentives can start working again. 
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The main problem with the analysis detailed above is 
the use of Tobin's Q to measure market valuation of firms. 
However, as MSV (1988) mention, an event study approach 
cannot be used because there are hardly any large unexpected 
changes in ownership structure uncontaminated by 
accompanying news like corporate control contests. 
Stulz (1988) offers a theory relating management 
ownership to Tobin's Q that focusses on the takeover 
process. In his theory, management's preference for control 
(and consequent refusal to tender its shares) forces 
acquirers to pay higher premiums to gain control when 
management's stake is higher? this sometimes leads to an 
increase in the target's ex-ante value. When management's 
stake is so large that no takeover can be profitable, the 
ex-ante takeover price includes no takeover premium, and is 
therefore low. Stulz's theory differs from Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) at the lower end of management ownership 
since increased shareholder welfare from higher management 
ownership results from more effective opposition to 
takeovers and not from better alignment of management and 
shareholder interests. Stulz's theory is closely related to 
the entrenchment hypothesis of MSV (1988) at the higher end 
as high management ownership effectively precludes a 
takeover. 
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2.5.3 Managerial Ownership of Stock Options 
There have been relatively few studies relating the 
incidence of stock options to management behavior. In a 
study of changes in managerial incentives on initial 
adoption of stock option plans, Lambert and Larcker (1984) 
hypothesize that the adoption of stock option plans affect 
the executive's risk preferences leading to changes in the 
executive's actions that impact on the variability of the 
firm's stock price. Standard option pricing analysis 
indicates that the variability of the firm's stock price is 
an important factor for determining the value of a stock 
option to an executive. The incorporation of stock options 
into the managers' compensation contracts will encourage 
them to increase the variability of the firm's stock price 
and make them less averse toward risk. However, if the 
executives are unable to create a riskless hedge (because of 
their inability to short sell the stock of their own firm) 
and they are further unable to transfer the option, the 
value of the option need not increase in variance. In fact, 
the authors find that the adoption of the plan is associated 
with a decrease in both unsystematic risk and total variance 
of equity returns. 
Lambert and Larcker conclude from their study that the 
institution of a stock option plan may not be useful if 
executives are more risk averse than the extent desired by 
stockholders. The adoption of the stock option plan, while 
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helping to synchronize manager-stockholder interests and 
lengthening the manager's decision-making time horizon, can 
actually increase the risk-aversion of the executive. The 
design of stock option contracts (for the purpose of 
mitigating a manager's risk aversion) may thus require an 
assessment of the interaction between the degree of 
managerial risk-aversion and the rate of return and the 
variance of the firm's stock. 
Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) investigate the effect of 
managerial incentives created by holdings of stock and stock 
options on the investment and financing decisions of the 
firm. Since managerial decisions are influenced by personal 
wealth considerations, a manager's holdings of common stock 
and options will be related to the characteristics of the 
investment decisions made by the firm and the resultant 
changes in the variability of the firm's assets. Three 
kinds of investment decisions are examined in the study - 
acquisition by mergers, acquisition by tender offers, and 
divestiture by selloffs. The study also seeks to find a 
relationship between a manager's security holdings and the 
firm's financing decisions. 
The managers have opposing incentives in the selection 
of risky projects. They like to select investment projects 
that reduce the variability of the firm's earnings stream, 
due to overinvestment of human capital in one firm and 
underdiversification of the personal wealth portfolio. This 
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incentive is strengthened by the fact that the variance of 
their employment income is increased and the certainty 
equivalent of the cash flow stream of their income is 
reduced if there is an increase in the variance of the 
firm's assets. 
In contrast, from option pricing considerations, the 
existence of risky debt causes the value of stock to 
appreciate as the variance of the firm goes up. Further, an 
increase in the variance of the firm enhances the variance 
of stock. Large stock and option holdings can thus induce 
managers to select variance increasing corporate 
investments. On the financing side, a reduction of 
financial leverage augments the value of the remaining risky 
debt because bondholders get better protection on their 
claims. If the financing decision is to have no impact on 
the value of firm, there must be a diminution in the value 
of old equity and executive stock options. This will 
further imply a reduction in the variance of stock returns. 
Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) find that the relative 
stock and option holdings of managers of the group of firms 
that select investments resulting in variance increases 
(increase in risk) is considerably higher than that for the 
variance decreasing group of firms. Hence, executives' 
security holdings induce them to make investment decisions 
in the interests of their stockholders. Executive security 
holdings are also observed to curtail agency problems 
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between managers and stockholders with respect to the firm's 
financing decision. There is a decrease in stockholder's 
wealth when leverage is lowered. Managers with low stock 
holdings are thus more likely to reduce leverage. 
Having reviewed the relevant literature, we now turn to 
an examination of corporate control contests as they relate 
to the issues in this dissertation. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. When, however, the takeover effort failed, generally 
all the gains to the target from the merger activity 
were lost (Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1983). 
2. Dennis and McConnell (1986) show (for their sample) 
that the dollar gains are comparable for bidders and 
targets, despite the marked difference in percentage 
returns because bidders outsize targets by large 
amounts. Thus, in dollar terms, both benefit equally 
from the merger. However, these results are slightly at 
variance with those of a similar study conducted by 
Malatesta (1983). Malatesta finds an insignificant 
dollar loss for the bidding firm. The two studies are, 
however, not strictly comparable as the event dates 
were different (merger announcement date for the Dennis 
and McConnell study and around the month of board 
approval for the Malatesta study). 
3. In these studies, the samples cover only the decades of 
the 1970s and the 1980s. 
4. According to a Historical Note in Mergerstat Review 
(1982), "hostile raids as an established acquisition 
strategy originated in 1974 when Morgan Stanley & Co. 
represented International Nickel Co. of Canada in its 
hostile and successful offer for ESB, Inc. The fact 
that Morgan Stanley, a reputable investment banking 
firm, was engaged in such action rendered the hostile 
takeover an acceptable practice. The prevalence of 
takeover battles resulted in a specialized industry 
consisting of investment bankers, attorneys, proxy 
solicitors, and public relations professionals, all of 
whom were offering expertise on offensive and defensive 
tactics." - p. 43. 
5. Schipper and Thomson (1983) show that bidding firms 
generate positive abnormal returns during the 
announcement of an acquisition policy. Studies on 
bidder returns generally measure the impact of 
implementation of the policy. 
6. Tobin's Q is defined to be equal to the ratio of the 
firm's market value to the replacement cost of its 
physical assets. Tobin's Q is high when the firm has 
valuable intangible assets in addition to physical 
assets, e.g. monopoly power, goodwill, a stock of 
patents, or good managers. Measurement difficulties 
make the Tobin's Q an imprecise estimator of firm 
performance. 
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7. Seyhun (1990) seeks to provide empirical evidence for 
this point of view through a study of stock 
transactions of top managers of bidding firms for their 
personal accounts as signals of their motivations. 
8. The rationale of Shleifer and Vishny (1988, 1989) is 
consistent with earlier explanations of managerial 
behavior in the context of conglomerate mergers, where 
managers were posited to be diversifying their 
employment risk through acquisitions (Amihud and Lev, 
1981; Amihud, Dodd and Weinstein, 1986). However, 
Lewellen, Loderer and Rosenfeld (1989) do not find any 
empirical evidence of reduction in firm risk as a 
result of mergers. 
9. BDK (1988) have two partitions, in 1968 and 1980, over 
the range of their sample period from 1963 to 1984. 
Since hostile bids originated in 1974 (see footnote 4 
above), the incidence of multiple bids can only be 
significant for that segment of the time interval 
1969-1980 which occurred after 1974. As such, a more 
revealing comparison of single bid acquirers with 
multiple bid acquirers could perhaps have been made 
with an additional partition of the sample in 1974. 
10. BDK (1988) further state that "our data indicate that 
the average white knight pays 'too much' for the target 
it acquires" - p.25. No reason or explanation is 
offered for such overpayment. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CONTROL CONTESTS INVOLVING WHITE KNIGHTS 
3.1 Description of WK Contests 
One of the successful ways by which a target can fend 
off an unwelcome bidder in a corporate control contest is to 
invite a friendly third party (the WK) to subsequently bid 
for the target and acquire it. This may not be a preferred 
outcome for the managers of the target, who may much rather 
have their firm retain its independent existence for the 
foreseeable future. Yet, on being confronted with a bid by 
a HB, they may be left with no alternative than to choose to 
be acquired by the friendly WK.1 In a corporate control 
contest, the WK bid has several features and motivations not 
readily found in other corporate control situations. These 
are: 
(i) From the WK's point of view, it is a takeover bid 
which makes the battle for corporate control at least 
a three-party contest consisting of a target, a hostile 
bidder, and a friendly bidder. The same target 
simultaneously entertains both a hostile bid and a 
friendly bid in an auction market for the target. 
(ii) From the target's point of view, it is an antitakeover 
defense against the HB following a takeover bid, 
thereby yielding a strong positive target shareholder 
wealth reaction unavailable in other anti-takeover 
defenses. 
(iii) The original HB or other potential bidders always have 
the option of offering a higher bid than the WK, 
thereby enlarging the auction process. The antitakeover 
defense of the target firms' managers may be said to 
have failed, and their own future may be in jeopardy, 
if the WK does not finally prevail. Yet, through the 
process, target shareholders may gain significantly as 
bids pile up on top of one another. 
(iv) The WK bid may be looked upon as an acquisition-based 
preventive antitakeover measure of the WK, masquerading 
as a subsequent friendly bid. By acquiring the target, 
the WK makes itself larger and more difficult to 
acquire.2 In the process, it may also remove some of 
its own attractiveness as a takeover target e.g. excess 
cash. However, the unplanned nature of the WK bid 
may makes this antitakeover outcome more a consequence 
of the process than a motivation for the WK to 
undertake such activity. 
We feel that the various distinguishing features of 
WKs, as outlined above, make takeover battles involving WKs 
a singularly appropriate framework for a detailed study of 
- the bidding process in corporate acquisitions, 
managerial motivations in the firms involved in 
these processes, and 
investor reactions to activities in the multiparty 
corporate control market.3 
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In a two-bidder context where the motives of the 
bidders may not be identical, an acquisition effort for a 
target firm has a lot of similarities with auction activity 
(Roll, 1986). In fact, Fishman (1988) analyzes competitive 
bidding in takeovers by initially assuming it to be 
equivalent to an English Auction,4 with the bidders 
initiating the bidding process rather than the target 
offering itself for sale.5 The base price of the target 
firm is likely to correspond to the current market value of 
its stockholders' wealth when the bidding begins. 
Presumably, the first bidder makes its bid after a careful 
scrutiny of the target firm. The amount it ultimately pays 
for the target will be capped by the lower of: 
(a) the potential of the target to generate wealth 
(through future activity, divestiture, spinoffs, or 
outright restructuring/sale of assets) in excess of 
the amount paid by the bidder to the target firm, or 
(b) The resources which the bidder is able to assemble for 
the purpose of the takeover. 
In practice, the bidding typically begins at a lower level 
and may not reach values where resource constraints come 
into play. 
The WK enters the auction after the control contest has 
begun. Since the primary intent of the WK bid seems to be 
to support the "friendly" management of the target firm, it 
is unlikely that the WK firm has made a prior (planned) 
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evaluation of the value of the target to it as an 
acquisition.6 Once the control contest has begun, there 
may be inadequate time for an appropriate independent 
scrutiny. We may thus reasonably conjecture that the WK has 
undertaken little detailed examination of the target firm,7 
or else the WK itself may have been the likely acquirer in a 
friendly takeover.8 
3.2 Bidding Variations in WK Contests 
A detailed investigation of the sequence of bidding in 
the control contests with WK participation reveals three 
distinct market processes as follows: 
(i) The common occurrence is for the HB bid (H) to be 
rejected by the target, and a follow up bid by a WK (W) 
leading to the withdrawal of the HB. This situation 
corresponds to the construct described by Giammarino 
and Heinkel (1986) and is the standard bidding 
situation. 
(ii) In some instances, the first bid (H), on rejection, is 
followed up by a second (or even third) higher bid (H) 
by the HB. This is followed by the WK bid (W) and the 
withdrawal of the HB. This process is described under 
the bidding acronym HHW. The bidding pattern here does 
not precisely conform to the English auction structure, 
as the second higher bid is made by the HB. Yet, an 
auction does take place since the subsequent bid/(s) of 
the HB is/are followed by the WK bid.9 
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(iii)In some cases, the bidding is sequential (HW) as in 
English Auctions, but the WK bid is followed by one or 
more sequences of HW (e.g. HWHW) before the end of the 
contest. Thus, in these situations, the HB bids at 
least once after a WK bid, and the WK bids at least 
twice after HB bids. This process is described as 
alternating sequential bidding (ASB). 
This review of market processes indicates that based on 
the respective presence of HHW and ASB attributes, there are 
two relevant partitions of these contests on the basis of 
sequencing of bids: 
Instances where the WK bid is the third bid (W) in the 
sequence after two consecutive bids (HH) by the same 
HB - the HHW WKs - are distinguished from other cases 
of sequential bids (H always followed by W) by 
different parties from the first bid onwards - the 
non-HHW WKs.10 
Instances of alternating sequential bidding, where each 
of the pair of bidders has bid more than once on an 
alternating basis - the ASB WKs - are separated from 
the contrasting situation of only one sequence of HW in 
the control contest - the non-ASB WKs. 
3.3 Hypotheses - Bidding Behavior 
In formulating the hypotheses below, we assume that the 
target's valuation is not identical to the HB and the WK. 
Since the WK bid has to improve upon the preceding HB 
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bid(s) , it may end up overpaying the target firm to the 
detriment of its own stockholders.11 In such situations, 
the WK stockholders and the pool of investors may not be 
favorably disposed to the actions of the managers of the WK 
in following a possible non-value maximizing strategy. 
Since these stockholders and the investors are likely to 
perceive the WK activity as a negative net present value 
project, their displeasure will likely be reflected in a 
significant fall in the WK stockholders' wealth. We thus 
hypothesize that on average, the WK stock price will react 
negatively to the WK bid. 
3.3.1 Hypotheses Regarding HHW WKs 
We hypothesize that the initial absence of sequential 
bidding in HHW cases will impact on the first WK bid. The 
fact that the HB submits a second bid immediately following 
its first bid can reasonably be interpreted to imply that 
(i) The first bid is low, below the maximum the HB is 
willing and able to offer. 
(ii) The second bid is likely to capture all or most of the 
anticipated gains for the HB. 
This generates two competing hypotheses: 
Overpayment Hypothesis: Since synergistic gains for the HHW 
WKs are likely to have been fully captured by the HB 
(through the second bid), there is a greater probability of 
the WK bid being an overpayment; the HHW WKs will thus have 
a larger negative abnormal return for the first WK bid. 
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This situation will be more likely for identical valuation 
of the target by the HB and the WK, and can lend strong 
support to the view that managers of all WK firms are indeed 
going in for growth maximization (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988) 
at the cost of firm value maximization. 
•'Correlated Values"12 Hypothesis: For the HHW process, the 
WK seems to enter the auction process later - after two 
preceding bids. The HB's second bid is likely to alert the 
WK that synergistic gains to the HB have pretty much been 
captured in the existing bids. As such, the WK is not likely 
to enter the fray and overbid the HB - unless it is aware of 
specific synergies for itself in the acquisition, not 
available to the HB. Further, the fact that the WK bid 
comes sequentially after two HB bids signifies that the WK 
managers are more likely to have professionally evaluated 
the takeover. Thus, the WK is now in a much better position 
to avoid the "winner's curse." As McAfee and McMillan 
(1987) point out, the assumption relating to independent 
private values13 is violated for correlated values of the 
object of the auction? in this situation, English 
auctions14 (as the bidding process in these control 
contests constitute) result in a minimization of the 
"winner's curse."15 For all the above reasons, the 
negative abnormal return for the HHW WKs is likely to be 
less than that for the non-HHW WKs. 
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3.3.2 The Time Interval Dimension 
As stated in section 3.2 above, the WK bid is likely to 
be made in relative haste in the available time window after 
the HB bid. Necessarily, an important dimension in this 
process is time, which can be considered to be a proxy for 
the extent of appraisal made by the WK prior to its bid. As 
such, we posit that the time gap T between the first WK bid 
and the prior HB bid will influence the abnormal return 
(CAR) to the WK in a positive manner. The shorter this time 
span, the larger will be the negative excess return. We 
thus postulate (for later empirical examination) an equation 
of the form 
CAR = a + B^D + 132*T + e (1) 
D is a dummy representing WKs under the HHW market 
process. The negative reaction to the WK bid will lead to a 
negative sign for the estimator a of the intercept. The 
"correlated values" hypothesis stated in section 3.3.1 will 
imply a positive sign for b1, the estimator of the 
coefficient of the dummy variable representing WKs under the 
HHW process. The overpayment hypothesis will imply the 
opposite sign for b1. In other words, the existence of the 
HHW feature will result in a lateral reduction in the 
negative CAR for WKs. The sign of the estimator b2 for the 
coefficient of the time interval variable will be positive, 
to corroborate the position that the lack of extensive 
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examination of the target (for which the time interval is a 
proxy) causes the negative CARs for WKs. 
3.3.3 Hypotheses regarding ASB WKs 
In respect of the ASB WKs, there are two competing 
hypotheses: 
Repetition Hypothesis: In the ASB market process, 
sequential auction-like bidding recurs. Each subsequent bid 
of the WK can be looked upon as a repetition of the sequence 
begun by them with their first bid. If the reaction to the 
first WK bid is negative, there will be significant negative 
abnormal returns for the subsequent WK bids as well. While 
the HB's second bid will indicate to the market that their 
bidding margin is not yet exhausted, this bid will appear in 
the second sequence and hence not be known to the WK 
stockholders when they react to the first WK bid. They will 
thus react to the subsequent bids of the WK managers in the 
same way in which they reacted to the first (i.e. not 
expecting a subsequent HB bid), perhaps more severely so, 
assuming at each stage that the WK managers have overbid. 
Also, if this hypothesis is true, the outcome of the contest 
will be more likely to be successful acquisition by the WK. 
Recovery Hypothesis: Alternatively, one can hypothesize 
that the losses suffered in the first WK bid will be 
recovered in the subsequent WK bids; for the existence of 
subsequent HB bids indicates that the first WK bid is more 
likely to have been a firm value maximization strategy. 
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This situation is more likely for identical valuation of the 
target by the HB and the WK. The higher HB bid can then be 
taken as a signal of target value, and market reaction to 
the subsequent WK bids will neutralize the negative reaction 
to the first WK bid. 
3.4 Hypotheses - Managerial Motivation 
The hypotheses laid out in this section require a 
consideration of the conflicting hypotheses regarding the 
bidding behavior of WKs and their various partitions based 
on bidding sequence. This consideration requires that we 
preview the results from testing the bidding sequence 
hypotheses. We accordingly posit the managerial motivation 
hypotheses based on the results of testing the hypotheses 
regarding bidding behavior elucidated in the preceding 
section, and drawing appropriate inferences from the same 
(as discussed in chapter 5). Specifically, the "Correlated 
Values" hypothesis is seen to be valid for WKs under the HHW 
market process, and the Repetition hypothesis is seen to be 
valid for the WKs under the ASB market process. The 
hypotheses in this section are further motivated by the 
following premises: 
The presence of stock and stock options in compensation 
packages provides incentives to managers to maximize 
the value of the stock of the firm and hence align 
their interests with those of the stockholders. Agency 
conflicts between stockholders and managers are thereby 
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minimized. Managers will thus be more inclined to 
undertake actions which maximize the value of the firm 
if they have a larger proportion of their compensation 
in the form of stock and stock options relative to 
other cash and cash-equivalent forms of compensation. 
Conversely, a relatively larger proportion of cash and 
cash-equivalent forms of remuneration in managerial 
compensation packages is likely to provide incentives 
to managers for maximizing the size of the firm: the 
strong positive empirical relationship between firm 
size and cash and cash-equivalent forms of compensation 
is well documented. The lower proportion of stock and 
stock options in this kind of remuneration package 
will likely not encourage managers to conform to the 
stockholder goal of firm value maximization. On the 
other hand, the resultant incentive may well act to the 
detriment of the stockholders as managers are 
encouraged to undertake value-reducing acquisitions 
with the sole objective of increasing size and thereby 
increasing their cash compensation. 
The presence of relatively higher levels of debt in the 
capital structure of firms is likely to imply the 
existence of better monitoring mechanisms for a closer 
scrutiny of the managers' actions. The additional 
supervision arising out of the existence of debt can 
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thus be a disincentive to the managers for actions 
which do not maximize firm value. 
In the above context, it becomes necessary to evaluate 
the relative influence on observed WK behavior of the two 
competing kinds of managerial remuneration - one aligning 
the interests of the managers with those of the stockholders 
(in the form of managerial ownership and holdings of stock 
options) and the other motivating an increase in size (in 
the form of cash and cash-equivalent compensation). Three 
issues of concern need to be addressed here. They are as 
follows:- 
The variables used in the analysis need to be defined 
as ratios in order to incorporate the incentive effects 
of both stock (and stock option) ownership and cash 
remuneration. 
To the extent feasible, the variables used in the 
analysis need to be normalized for size. 
To provide economic content to the ratios defined, 
both the numerator and the denominator need to be 
expressed in comparable units. 
Since stock and stock option ownership are "stock" 
variables representing wealth, and cash and cash equivalent 
compensation is a "flow" variable representing income, the 
"stock" of common equity and options are converted to "flow" 
variables by multiplying the "stock" variable by the rate of 
return of the relevant common stock. As managerial 
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motivation is more likely governed by ex-ante expectations 
of income flows from managerial holdings, we consider it 
appropriate to use the expected rate of return (as opposed 
to a historical rate of return) on the relevant common stock 
when converting the "stock" variable to the "flow" variable. 
Also, by defining variables with cash compensation in the 
denominator, the impact (if any) of size on the variables is 
considerably reduced due to the strong empirical 
relationship between cash compensation and size. 
The following variables of interest are accordingly 
defined: 
INCENTIVE VARIABLES 
Annual expected income from stock holding 
1. COM = - 
Annual cash and cash-equivalent remuneration 
Annual expected income from stock options held 
2. OP =  
Annual cash-and cash-equivalent remuneration 
MONITORING VARIABLE 
Book value of outstanding debt 
3. DEQ = - 
Market value of common equity 
We note in this regard that managerial motivation 
resulting from alignment of managers' interests with those 
of the stockholders is traditionally measured in the 
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literature (see chapter 2) through a variable MGR, defined 
as 
Total shares of common stock held by managers 
MGR -- 
Total number of common shares of the firm 
Although size (for which the market value of total common 
stock is treated as a proxy) and cash compensation have been 
empirically found to be correlated, we maintain that the 
direct incentive consequences of cash compensation cannot be 
fully evaluated by using size as a proxy for the same. 
While the hypotheses below are formulated and the study is 
carried out using our constructed variables COM, OP and DEQ, 
we have simultaneously reported the results using MGR 
wherever appropriate. 
We posit that 
Hypothesis 1: 
Ceteris paribus, managers of WK firms will have a 
lower COM as compared to managers of HB firms. 
Control HB firms are more likely to have managers acting in 
the best interests of their stockholders. This is evidenced 
by the absence of significant market reaction to the HB 
bids, as detailed in chapter 5. The compensation packages 
of the managers of HBs will presumably incorporate a greater 
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proportion of stock holdings (excluding unexercised stock 
options) relative to the compensation packages of the 
managers of WKs, to provide more incentive to meet the 
stockholder goal of firm value maximization. Since both the 
HB and the WK operate in control contests in the same time 
frame, any tax-incentive effects of compensation in the form 
of stock or stock options will be common to both groups and 
hence controlled for. 
Hypothesis 2: 
Ceteris paribus, managers of WK firms will have a 
lower OP than the managers of HB firms. 
Stock options, a form of deferred compensation to deal with 
the time horizon problem of the manager, give him/her a 
stake in the firm's future cash flows, which are, after all, 
discounted at appropriate rates to yield shareholder value. 
This encourages the manager toward variance increasing 
investment projects which increase the value of the option. 
Yet, the options also increase the riskiness of his/her 
personal wealth which cannot be diversified away like that 
of investors. This may make him/her more reluctant to 
choose variance increasing projects. Available evidence 
seems to indicate that the incentive effects overwhelm those 
of increased risk exposure (LLM, 1987; Agrawal & Mandelker, 
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1987).16 Incentive effects for firm value maximization 
are likely to be lower for WK firms, implying a lower 
proportion of unexercised valid stock options in the 
compensation packages of their managers. 
Hypothesis 3: 
Ceteris paribus, WK firms will have a lower DEQ 
than HB firms. 
The presence of higher levels of debt can ensure better 
monitoring of managerial activity through bond covenants 
(Smith and Warner, 1979). This tends to restrict the amount 
of "free" cash flow available to managers (Jensen, 1986) and 
hence makes them act in a firm value maximizing way. 
According to this approach, managers will prefer relatively 
lower levels of debt to avoid monitoring if they are 
desirous of acting in a non firm value maximizing manner. On 
the other hand, the same managers may have an inclination 
for higher levels of debt based upon their holding of stock 
options. The larger the risky debt of the firm, the greater 
is the value of the stock options held by the manager, 
because a reduction of debt causes a reduction in the 
variance of stock returns as existing debt becomes more 
valuable at the cost of equity and stock options. Managers 
of WKs will likely have a greater propensity for "free" cash 
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flow and correspondingly, the WK firms will have a lower 
DEQ. However, this will be predicated on the managers of WK 
firms having low holdings of stock options relative to HB 
firms (hypothesis 2) and relative to other forms of 
compensation in the form of stock or cash (as observed 
empirically) .17 
Hypothesis 4: 
Ceteris paribus, managers of non-HHW WK firms will 
have a lower COM as compared to managers of HHW WK 
firms. 
This hypothesis originates from the extent and significance 
of wealth reduction on first or subseguent bidding by the 
WK, as discussed in chapter 5. For the HHW WKs, the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is considerably less 
negative, and is not significant across all time intervals. 
In the two day interval ending with the date of the first WK 
bid, the average CAR is -1.0% and -4.1% for HHW WKs and non- 
HHW WKs respectively. Besides, 56% of the CARs are negative 
for HHW WKs and 85% of the CARs are negative for non-HHW 
WKs. These results do indicate that the market does not 
react as adversely to bids by HHW WKs as it does to bids by 
non-HHW WKs. This hypothesis seeks to link this external 
manifestation of WK bids to the incentive alignments in the 
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compensation structure of their managers in the form of 
holdings of common stock of the firm. Support for this 
hypothesis will indicate that managers of HHW WKs may indeed 
be desirous of acting in a firm value maximizing manner as 
per their remuneration scheme, yet be afflicted by hubris or 
the winner's curse resulting in unintentional overpayment. 
In this sense, the incentive alignments of managers of HHW 
WKs may not be significantly different from those of 
managers of HBs. 
Hypothesis 5: 
Ceteris paribus, managers of non-HHW WK firms will 
have a lower OP as compared to managers of HHW WK 
firms. 
This hypothesis originates from the same premises as the 
preceding one. Empirical support will indicate the 
disinclination on the part of managers of non-HHW WKs to 
engage in firm value maximizing activity. 
Hypothesis 6: 
Ceteris paribus, non-HHW WK firms will have a 
lower DEQ than HHW WK firms. 
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The premises for the hypothesis are similar to the arguments 
used to support hypothesis 3. Empirical evidence in its 
favor will be an indication of monitoring effectiveness and 
the validity of the "free" cash flow hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 7: 
Ceteris paribus, there will be no difference in 
COM, OP or DEQ between managers of ASB WK firms 
and managers of non-ASB WK firms. 
In constructing hypotheses relating to managerial 
motivation, there is a critical difference between the HHW 
and ASB market processes for WKs. The distinguishing 
features of the HHW WK manifest themselves prior to the 
first WK bid. However, prior to the first WK bid, there is 
no difference between the standard HW sequence and the ASB 
market process. Accordingly, incentive-related variables may 
not affect ASB WKs differentially if the Repetition 
Hypothesis of bidding behavior is found to be valid. In 
such instances, the ASB process is perceived to be a 
repetition of the standard HW process with similar market 
reaction in each HW sequence. Hypothesis 7 is generated 
from the empirical validity of the Repetition hypothesis as 
an explanation for the bidding behavior of ASBs (shown in 
Chapter 5). 
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The various hypotheses presented above (supported by 
empirical testing) will indeed show the absence of 
homogeneity among WKs, and validate the basic partitioning 
of the sample according to the sequence of bidding. The 
return consequences for HHW WKs seem to be not much 
different from the HBs, with negative CARs during their bids 
being likely due to hubris or the "winner's curse". In 
contrast, non-firm value maximizing factors like size 
maximization or "free" cash flow consumption are more likely 
to govern the CARs for the non-HHW WKs. The ASB WKs 
manifest themselves as the extreme fringe of this latter 
group of non-HHW WKs in their bidding behavior. However, 
this feature will not be distinguishable from the incentive 
related behavior of their managers, which reveal themselves 
during their first bid. 
In developing the aforesaid hypotheses, the behavior of 
managers of the various categories of bidding firms defined 
above are postulated to be motivated by the structure of 
their compensation packages and monitoring intensity implied 
by higher levels of leverage. Structural differences in 
these variables thus distinguish firms characterized by 
firm-value maximizing managers from others characterized by 
managers whose incentives may not propel them toward an 
objective of firm value maximization. Since the abnormal 
returns in the context of the market model measure the 
investor reaction to firm specific events, such returns are 
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an indicator of whether the market views the bidding event 
as firm value maximizing. The variables representing 
compensation and capital structures thus not only lead to 
significant positive variation in the abnormal returns in a 
cross-sectional context, but the resulting regression is 
also able to identify structural differences across the 
various groups of bidders. We thus specify the following 
model: 
CAR = a + B^COM + B2*OP + B3*DEQ + e (2) 
where 
CAR = Two day cumulative abnormal return for the 
bidding firm ending on date of the bid. 
COM = Proportion of firm stock held by managers as a 
share of cash and cash-equivalent compensation. 
OPT = Proportion of unexercised valid stock options 
held by managers as a share of cash and cash- 
equivalent compensation. 
DEQ = Debt-equity ratio 
Support of the various hypotheses stated above will 
imply that the estimators of the coefficients of the 
independent variables will all be significant and have 
positive signs. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. For a general management perspective on WKs, see 
Kesner and Dalton (1985) and Jennings and Mazzeo 
(1986). Though the relative articles have not been 
used for sample selection, the cases cited in the 
articles independently form part of our sample. 
2. Lofthouse (1984) points out that an acguisition will 
make a firm more expensive to acguire. However, we do 
recognize the ambiguity of increasing size as an 
effective antitakeover strategy. 
3. It is interesting to note, in this regard, that while 
there is substantial literature ascribing target 
managers' behavior in corporate control contests to 
"management entrenchment", especially in regard to 
antitakeover defenses, there is hardly any reference to 
such "entrenchment" for the bidder managers for any of 
their actions in these contests. If one accepts the 
hypothesis that target managers may not act in the best 
interest of their shareholders in control contests, the 
same possibility cannot be ruled out for the bidding 
firm's managers. This point was made by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1988). 
4. McAfee and McMillan (1987) define an auction as "a 
market institution with an explicit set of rules 
determining resource allocation and prices on the basis 
of bids from the market participants." The 
distinguishing features of the English Auction are: 
the price is successively raised until only one 
bidder remains. 
At any point in time, each bidder knows the level 
of the current best bid. 
5. Also, the object of the auction changes continually in 
contrast to the English auction where the object does 
not change for the duration of the auction (Khanna, 
1986). 
6. We acknowledge the feasibility of a WK bid arising out 
of other reasons viz. 
- The bid could be part of a capital acguisition 
strategy by the bidder, with the WK nature of the 
bid being coincidental. The WK firm could also be 
following a policy of not making hostile bids, as 
part of its overall strategy. 
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The bid could be in the nature of a large 
investment not for acquiring control, but for 
defeating the first hostile bid. 
We deal with these motivations while discussing the 
results. 
7. A detailed appraisal by the WK would have likely 
included an estimate of the maximum amount the WK 
should pay for the target after taking into 
consideration all the potential synergistic factors. 
The relative haste with which the subsequent bid is 
made by the WK also prevents an assessment of whether 
the HB has already reached the maximum value of its 
bidding range. 
8. Lofthouse (1984) makes the point that if there is merit 
to acquisition by the WK, there seems to be no rational 
reason for it to risk a contested bid instead of going 
in for a preemptive bid. 
9. If the process ended with a higher bid by the HB after 
the rejection of its first bid, it would be an economic 
bargaining process with no auction features. The 
auction is triggered by the WK bid. 
10. In the HHW market process, the auction does not 
commence with the second bid, which is made by the same 
bidder who made the first bid. The first WK bid, which 
is the third bid in the sequence, triggers the auction. 
11. As detailed in Chapter 2, the reasons for possible 
overpayment by the managers of bidding firms can be 
ascribed to hubris (Roll, 1986), to "winner's curse" 
(Varaiya and Ferris, 1987), to free cash flow (Jensen, 
1986), and to growth maximization (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1988) . 
12. A detailed description of correlated values in auctions 
is available in McAfee and McMillan (1987), p 720. 
13. The assumption of independent private values postulates 
that any one bidder's valuation is statistically 
independent from any other bidder's valuation. Thus, 
each bidder knows precisely the value of the auctioned 
object to itself, but does not know the value of the 
object to the other bidders. Giliberto and Varaiya 
(1989) apply this concept to bank auctions. 
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14 . It should be noted that the market process examined 
here deviates from the traditional English Auction in 
as much as the value of the auctioned object is no 
longer time invariant. 
15. We assume that the first bids of the HB and the WK 
arise from their independent distributions of the 
valuation of the target. The second bid of the HB, if 
arising prior to the WK bid, uses up most of the 
synergy anticipated by the HB, and provides imperfect 
information to the WK about the value of the target. 
This information warns the WK that the cost of a 
successful bid will be high, and helps in reducing the 
"winner's curse". 
16. An exception is the study by Lambert & Larcker (1984) 
which shows that the introduction of a stock option 
plan leads to a decrease in variance for the firm. 
17. Smiley and Stewart (1985) mention that WK firms have 
high leverage. We feel that such a situation will 
arise only if the holding of stock options of WK 
managers is high enough in absolute and relative terms 
to predominate their urge for "free" cash flow, which 
can enable them to enhance their cash compensation by 
increasing size. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Data Identification 
4.1.1 Sample of Contesting Firms 
Our definition of a WK requires the firm to fulfil both 
of the following criteria: 
1. It must make a subsequent bid to acquire the target, or 
to acquire a substantial non-majority interest in the 
target, after (a) one or more hostile bids; or (b) 
initiation of a proxy contest; or (c) acquisition of an 
equity position with hostile intent. 
2. There must be evidence of "collaboration" between the 
WK and the target prior to the WK bid, in published 
reports (by explicit reference in the responsible 
financial press to the bidder as WK), or other 
indications signifying collaboration. 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) note that takeover activity 
may take one of three forms: tender offer, merger, or proxy 
contest.1 The term WK is loosely used, in the context of 
their participation in such activity, to incorporate a 
number of different situations. For example, a target firm 
may always arrange to be preemptively taken another firm 
(termed as a WK by Mergerstat Review) in a friendly merger 
when the target firm is anticipating a hostile bid but none 
has materialized. In such situations, there is no bidding 
contest and the valuation consequences are likely to be 
similar to a friendly merger between the two firms. In 
addition, there can be a non-collaborative subsequent bidder 
in multiple bidding situations for the target where the bids 
from this bidder cannot be identified as friendly.2 Our 
definition of the WK excludes these occurrences, and 
incorporates only those firms which enter the bidding 
process with a friendly bid after the target's anti-hostile 
takeover defense is triggered (so far as its market 
informational characteristics are concerned) with the 
commencement of a takeover bid or proxy fight independent of 
the WK bid. In our study, WKs can exist only in the context 
of hostile takeover bids by non-WK firms or proxy contests 
launched by hostile dissidents or raiders or large open 
market purchases with hostile intent.3 Also, with only 
public firms being amenable to event analyses, subsequent 
friendly bidders which are private parties are excluded from 
the study. 
The corresponding HBs in the three party contests act, 
in some ways, like a control group with which WK reaction 
can be compared. For the proxy contests, the date of 
announcement of the proxy fight is treated as the date of 
the "bid", as this is the event date where most of the 
activity is observed as far as shareholders are concerned 
(Dodd and Warner, 1983). For large open market purchases, 
the date when the equity position is acquired with 
expression of hostile intent, as reported in the Wall Street 
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Journal, is treated as the date of the "bid". The study on 
bidding behavior is conducted using a sample of WK firms 
quoted in New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX) which fulfil the criteria listed in the 
previous paragraph during the 10-year period 1978-1987. The 
sample is primarily obtained from Mergerstat Review 
published by W.T. Grimm & Co., supplemented by a search from 
the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service (DJNS).4 
4.1.2 Compensation and Financial Data 
For conducting the second part of the study relating to 
manager motivation, the following data are obtained by 
scrutinizing the relevant annual proxy statement immediately 
preceding the control contest, filed by each firm with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC): 
- the extent of direct and beneficial ownership of common 
stock by the principal executive officers (managers) on 
a date immediately preceding the contest, 
the annual managerial compensation for the WK and HB 
firms for the financial year immediately preceding the 
contest, and 
the extent of outstanding (unexercised and unexpired) 
executive stock options held by managers (and their 
weighted average exercise price) on a date immediately 
preceding the contest. 
The information relating to direct and beneficial 
ownership of common stock by the principal executive 
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officers is available for all the firms, and sometimes 
indicates the inclusion of stock options exercisable within 
60 days. The number of such officers is disclosed along 
with the aggregate direct and beneficial ownership; yet no 
criteria for the selection of officers eligible to appear in 
the aggregation are ever listed in the proxy statements. 
In the earlier years of the sample time-period, the 
annual compensation for a predetermined and stated number of 
principal executive officers is listed under the following 
headings: 
A. Cash and cash-equivalent remuneration 
(i) Salaries, Director's Fees, Commissions and 
Bonuses, and 
(ii) Securities or property, insurance benefits or 
reimbursement, personal benefits. 
B. Aggregate of contingent forms of remuneration 
(including stock options, not separately indicated). 
In subsequent time periods, most firms report only part A 
above, separately or in the aggregate, as executive 
compensation during the time period. For these firms, the 
aggregate contingent compensation is not directly listed in 
the proxy statements either as part of total executive 
compensation or elsewhere in the proxy statement. For 
purposes of equivalence across time periods, and also 
because our hypotheses focus on cash and cash equivalent 
forms of compensation, we exclude aggregate deferred 
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compensation in our study even when they are available for 
some of the firms in the sample.5 Once again, the data is 
available for an aggregate number of principal executive 
officers, without any listing of the criteria for selection. 
The proxy statements for the firms in the sample always 
provide data regarding the executive stock options granted 
during the year and its weighted average exercise price. 
However, the variable of interest in the study is the value 
of the outstanding (unexercised and unexpired) stock options 
held by principal executive officers at any point of time, 
and their weighted average exercise price. The mode of 
description of executive stock options in the proxy 
statements also changes radically over time, and more so 
than the description of executive remuneration. 
Most existing studies which need to assign a dollar 
value to executive stock options use them for computing 
total compensation of managers. Since such compensation is 
correctly interpreted as the annual income of the managers, 
stock options are treated as deferred income. In doing so, 
the data of interest to researchers is the amount of stock 
options granted during the year for which the compensation 
is being measured, and its weighted average exercise price. 
In our study, however (also Agrawal and Mandelker; 1987), 
the variable of interest is the amount of unexercised stock 
options outstanding (including, and usually greater than the 
stock options granted during the year for which compensation 
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is being measured) and its weighted average exercise price, 
because managerial actions will be more likely to be 
motivated by this variable, rather than a variable 
representing merely the stock options granted during the 
year. We thus need the closing inventory of stock options 
and weighted average exercise price of these options.6 
The data on executive stock options in the proxy 
statements has wide variations, and there appears to be a 
time dimension to such reporting. The different types of 
reporting, and the approximations being used by us for 
obtaining the closing inventory of options and their 
weighted average exercise price from each of these reporting 
variations are detailed in section 4.3.1 below. 
For converting managerial holdings of common stock and 
stock options to an ex-ante potential income flow, the 
expected rate of return E(R) on common stock is calculated 
using the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Beta for each firm 
is obtained from the market model estimates as explained in 
section 4.2 below. The average market premium is considered 
to be 8.6%,7 and the risk-free rate is proxied by the 
average annual rate on 3 month Treasury Bills in the year 
preceding the contest, as reported in the Annual Statistical 
Digest of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. 
The financial data of relevance for the sample firms is 
obtained from two sources. The aggregate outstanding debt 
is obtained from the relevant Moody's Manuals (Industrial, 
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Transportation, Utilities, or Banking and Finance as the 
case may be). The aggregate value of common stock is 
extracted from the master tapes of the Center for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP). 
4.2 Methodology - Bidding Behavior 
The event time methodology is employed to examine the 
valuation consequences for each of the participants in 
multi-party contests involving WKs. The specific attributes 
of the methodology employed are those outlined by Hite and 
Owers (1983). The methodology accommodates the need to 
examine both fixed and variable length time intervals. 
For each security j, the market model is used to 
calculate an abnormal return (AR) for event day t as 
follows: 
ARit = [Rjt - (aj + bjKnt)] (3) 
where R-t is the rate of return on security j for event day 
t, and Rf)t is the rate of return on the Center for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP) value-weighted index on event day 
t. The coefficients and b.} are the ordinary least 
squares estimates of the intercept and slope, respectively, 
of the market model regression, which is run over an 
estimation period from t=-200 to t=-51, relative to the 
initial event date t=0. The initial event date (t=0) is the 
first date on which the relevant event is mentioned in the 
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Wall Street Journal - event dates are obtained from the Wall 
Street Journal Index. Abnormal returns are calculated for 
each security over the interval -50,...., L-, where L. is the 
number of trading days between the initial event date and 
the final event date for the firm j. The cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) from event day T^. to event day T2j. is 
defined as 
CARj- (4) 
t=T 
ij 
We cumulate over various intervals, some of which are of 
common length across securities (e.g., t = -50,.,0) and 
some of which vary across securities (e.g., t = -50,...,L-). 
For a sample of N securities, the mean CAR is defined as 
_ N 
CAR = 2 CAR. (5) 
j=i 
The expected value of CAR is zero in the absence of abnormal 
performance. 
The test statistic described by Dodd and Warner (1983) 
is the mean standardized cumulative abnormal return. To 
compute this statistic, the abnormal return ARjt is 
standardized by its estimated standard deviation Sjt,8 
i.e. , 
SARj, = (ARjt/sjt) (6) 
80 
The standardized cumulative abnormal return SCAR; over the 
interval t = T1 j..,T2j is 
SCAR,. = S SARjt/ J (T2j - Ttj + 1) (7) 
t=TU 
The test statistic for a sample of N securities is 
N _ 
Z = Z SCAR./7N (8) 
j=i 
Each SARjt is assumed to be distributed unit normal in the 
absence of abnormal performance. Under this assumption, Z 
is also unit normal. 
It can be conjectured that few firms adopt strategies 
to be a WK, as there are apparently no benefits to be 
derived by the shareholders from such a course of proposed 
action. This, coupled with the unanticipated, subsequent 
nature of the bid,9 makes it unlikely that the difficulties 
of interpreting abnormal bidder CARs around the event date 
will hold for WKs. 
Further, we feel that our hypothesis will be 
strengthened if the loss suffered by the WK around its bid 
is sustained over the entire period for which the WK 
participates in the contest. While we postulate no recovery 
at any stage, this conjecture has to be tested through the 
statistical significance of cumulative abnormal returns over 
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time periods ending on the date of withdrawal of the HB, and 
the date of completion of the contest. 
Another significant observation regarding the role of 
the time intervals in hypothesis testing is in order. For 
the WKs under the HHW market process, it is of interest to 
look at the effects of the second HB bid, and the time 
interval between the first WK bid and its immediately 
preceding HB bid, for comparison with the standard bidding 
process. On the other hand, the differential impact of WKs 
under the ASB market process will appear well inside the 
auction process, indicated in time intervals following the 
first WK bid.10 
The simple linear model specified in section 3.3.2 of 
chapter 3 is estimated on the computer software package 
SHAZAM using ordinary least squares regression. The model 
is checked for heteroskedasticity using the Goldfeld-Quandt 
test.11 As per the requirements of the test, the 
observations are ordered according to the magnitude of the 
explanatory variable (number of days between the WK bid and 
the preceding HB bid). One-sixth of the observations at the 
center of the range are excluded, leaving two nearly equal¬ 
sized groups of observations, one group corresponding to low 
values of the chosen independent variable T and the other 
group corresponding to high values. Separate regressions 
are run for the two groups of observations. The ratio of 
the sum of squared residuals for the two regressions is an 
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F-statistic, which is approximately unity if the error terms 
are homoskedastic. 
4.3 Methodology - Managerial Motivation 
The incentive and monitoring variables as defined in 
chapter 3 need to be structured for further analysis. The 
rate of return E(Rj) for converting the managerial holdings 
of stock and stock options to expected income is calculated 
from the following equation:12 
E(R.}) = Rf + (0.0860 * Bj.) (9) 
where E(Rj) = expected return on 'j'th stock. 
Rf = average annual 3 month Treasury bill rate. 
6j = Beta for stock 'j'. 
0.0860 represents the average market premium for stock 
returns over the risk free rate Rf. 
Now, for the 'j'th firm, let 
H - = number of shares of common stock of the 'j'th 
mj 
firm held by managers. 
HTj = total number of shares of common stock of the 
'j'th firm. 
S- = price of each share of common stock of the 
J 'j'th firm. 
V- = value of each stock option of the 'j'th firm. 
C- = annual cash and cash-equivalent compensation 
of the managers of the 'j'th firm. 
D- = book value of outstanding debt of the 'j'th 
1 firm. 
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Next, for the managers, let us define the variables 
COM, OP and MGR (as in Chapter 3, section 4), as under: 
COM 
Annual expected income from stock holding 
Annual cash and cash-equivalent remuneration 
OP 
Annual expected income from options holdings 
Annual cash and cash-equivalent remuneration 
Further, for the firm, we define the variable DEQ as: 
DEQ 
Book value of outstanding debt 
Market value of common stock 
We also define the variable MGR as: 
MGR 
Total common stock held by managers 
Total common stock of firm 
For the 'j'th firm, the above variables can then be 
mathematically expressed as: 
COMj = 
(Hmj * Sj) * E (R,) (io) 
Ci 
°Pj. 
V. * E (R:)13 
_2-- (li) 
cj 
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(12) DEQ, = --- 
(HIj * S;) 
MGRj = (Hmj. / HTj.) (13) 
While all the other variables are readily available, a 
suitable methodology is required for obtaining the value of 
vr 
4.3.1 Valuation of Executive Stock Options 
If the number of stock options outstanding is denoted 
by 'n', the stock price is denoted by SP and the weighted 
average exercise price by XP, the proxy statements provided 
four different types of data relating to executive stock 
options. These are listed below, along with the approach 
adopted to obtain consistent data on the number of stock 
options outstanding and their weighted average exercise 
price for valuation purposes. 
Type I: The number of stock options outstanding 'n' and 
their weighted average exercise price XP is 
directly available from the proxy statements. 
Type II: The number of stock options outstanding 'n' is 
directly available from the proxy statements along 
with the unrealized potential value UPV on the 
relevant date. In this situation, it is possible 
to calculate the XP from the following equation: 
UPV = [(SP - XP) * n] (14) 
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The equation, to yield correct results, uses the 
restrictive assumption that SP > XP for all 
outstanding options 'n' on the relevant date, 
since only these options will have unrealized 
potential value. 
Type III: The available data consists of: 
(a) The number of options granted during a period 'N1' 
and its weighted average exercise price XP1. 
(b) The number of options exercised during the same 
period XN2' and the net value realized R. 
In this situation, one has to examine proxy 
statements for the prior years till one finds a 
statement where the executive stock options are 
at least expressed as in Type II above, to get an 
opening inventory 'N' of stock options with a 
weighted average exercise price EP. In this case, 
the end of period inventory 'n' and the weighted 
average exercise price XP are given by: 
n = (N + N1 - N2) (15) 
[ (N * EP) + (N1 * XP^ ] 
Xp -- (16) 
(N + N1) 
This process is repeated recursively for each 
period till one reaches a date immediately 
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(i) 
(ii) 
Type IV: 
(a) 
(b) 
prior to the contest. While this method seems to 
be exact, there are two problems which result in 
imprecision in measurement: 
The time periods for which the data are reported 
in the annual proxy statements are not usually 
back to back, and there can be overlaps of up to 
two months in the reporting of this data in the 
proxy statements for any two successive years. 
For the overlap not to affect 'n', we need to 
assume that the number of options granted during 
each period of overlap is exactly equal to the 
number of prior options exercised during that 
period. XP will always be somewhat affected due 
to double counting of the options granted during 
each period of overlap. 
The annual proxy statements sometimes provide 
executive stock option data for five years instead 
of one year. In the version of reporting being 
presently described, such five year data reduce 
the inaccuracies due to reduction in the number of 
periods of overlap. 
The available data consists of: 
The number of options granted during a period 'N^ 
and its weighted average exercise price XP1. 
The net value realized R during the same period. 
Here, the procedure adopted in Type III above 
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can be followed in respect of XP. However, 'n' 
cannot be calculated as 'N2' is not available. 
N2 has to be calculated from the following 
construct: 
[(SP, - xp2) *N2] (17) 
[R/(SP, - XP2)] (18) 
Here, XP2 is the weighted average exercise price 
at the end of the preceding period (known to us), 
and SP1 is the price at which the option is 
exercised, which will likely be the relative 
stock price on the date of exercise. Since data 
on SP1 for options exercised is not available, it 
has to be proxied, for the entire period for 
which R is known, by the average month-end price 
of the relative stock for the period. While this 
method enables us to calculate both 'n' and XP, 
the inaccuracies increase when data on stock 
options are available on a five year consolidated 
basis (in contrast to Type III above), since SP1 
is then calculated on a five year month-end 
average. 
The traditional method of valuing executive stock 
options, used by Lewellen, Loderer and Martin (1987), is to 
value them in the year in which they are granted, at their 
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end-of-year exercise value, which is the difference between 
year-end market price and exercise price. The estimate is 
then revised every year, as the exercise value changes, up 
to the observed exercise date. Smith and Zimmerman (1976) 
feel that this method grossly underestimates the option 
value as it does not consider the discounted exercise price. 
Noreen and Wolfson (1981) derive a set of valuation 
formulas for warrants. For some of these warrants which 
have characteristics similar to executive stock options, the 
value of the warrant is given by the Black-Scholes valuation 
formula which allows for continuously paid dividends. This 
expression has been used for valuing stock options by Murphy 
(1985), with some simplifying assumptions as under: 
(i) Executive stock options are valued when they are 
granted. 
(ii) Options are granted at an exercise price equal to the 
market price on the date of the grant. 
In actual practice, the exercise price is very close to the 
market price for the stock on the date of the grant. 
There are a number of market imperfections affecting 
the valuation of executive stock options. These are: 
(i) The options are not transferable. 
(ii) The executive loses the right to exercise the options 
if he/she does not remain with the firm long enough to 
satisfy stated criteria. 
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(iii) Construction of appropriate riskless hedges is impeded 
by restrictions against insider trading. 
These restrictions tend to reduce the value of the option, 
since they increase the probability that the option will not 
eventually be exercised. The Black-Scholes formula will 
thus likely overestimate the true value of the option, and 
provide an upper bound. 
Smith and Zimmerman (1976) propose a method of valuing 
executive stock options which does not make any assumptions 
regarding the future distribution of stock prices. Their 
formulation, though not providing a precise value for the 
option, does give a lower bound on the option's value. It 
is based on the inference that the non-zero value of the 
option (at the time it is granted) is not less than the 
difference between the current stock price and the 
discounted future cash flows from exercising the option. 
The future cash flows consist of the cost of exercising X, 
and the foregone dividends D, adjusted for foregone interest 
on foregone dividends. The method has been used by Agrawal 
and Mandelker (1987), and is also used by us14 in the 
analysis with the assumptions stated thereagainst. If the 
value of each executive stock option be 0, then 
0 > Max [0, S - (X + D)B] (19) 
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where 
T 
D = S [d * (1 + r)1-'] (20) 
t=l 
B = [1 / (1 + r)T] (21) 
T = assumed to be 5 years for all options 
outstanding. 
dt = dividend per share declared in year t.15 
r = risk free rate, proxied by annual 3 month 
Treasury Bill rate. 
X = weighted average exercise price of options 
outstanding. 
S = stock price immediately prior to the contest on 
the date for which the option data is provided 
in the proxy statement. 
B = price of riskless discounted bond. 
The use of the lower bound will obviously undervalue 
the stock options. However, because of all the market 
imperfections for executive stock options cited earlier, 
the true value of the option will be less than its estimated 
value. Smith and Zimmerman thus feel that the true value 
will thus be closer to the lower bound derived from their 
valuation expression. The method (as also that of Murphy) 
has an upward bias as it does not adjust for dilution 
occurring from exercise of the options. However, this is 
expected to be very small, since outstanding options rarely 
exceed more than one or two percent of the outstanding 
common stock, and many of these options expire unexercised. 
91 
If the number of options outstanding is given by 'n', 
then the value V of the outstanding option holding for the 
principal executive officers of a firm is given by: 
V = (n * 0) (22) 
4.3.2 Statistical Testing of Hypotheses 
For each of the variables COM, OP, DEQ, as defined 
above, arithmetic means and variances about the mean are 
separately calculated for the different groups of interest. 
Difference between the means of the WK and the HB, the HHW 
WK and the non-HHW WK, the HHW WK and the HB, the non-HHW WK 
and the HB, and the ASB WK and the non-ASB WK, is tested for 
statistical significance by a t-test, under the assumption 
that the variables in both the groups are normally 
distributed, and the variable in both the groups is 
characterized by the same unknown population variance a2. 
In such a case, the test statistic T is given by16 
(Mt - M2) 
T (23) 
[syfl/n^ + U+n.,) ] 
p w * I r I ' C 
where s -- 
(n1 + n2 - 2) 
[ (n-,-1) s,2 + (n2-l)s22] 
(24) 
and 
Hy = mean of sample 1 
/x2 = mean of sample 2 
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n1 = size of sample 1 
n2 = size of sample 2 
s*= unbiased estimator of a2 from sample 1 
s22= unbiased estimator of a2 from sample 2 
The test statistic T then follows a studentized t 
distribution with (n1+n2-2) degrees of freedom. 
To account for the existence of outliers, if any, in 
the data, which will likely vitiate the assumption of 
normality required for the t-test, we also conduct the non- 
parametric Wilcoxon Test17 on the same data sets to test 
for the difference of medians between the two groups. To 
perform the test, the observations in both the groups are 
put together and ranked in order of increasing size. The 
test statistic W is the sum of ranks of the first group. If 
n1 > 10 or n2 > 10, the sampling distribution of W rapidly 
approaches that of a normal distribution with mean /xg and 
variance a2u, where and a2u are given by 
[n, * (n2 + 1) ] 
Mu = - (25) 
2 
[n1*n2*(n1 + n2 + 1) ] 
o2u = - (26) 
12 
The significance of an observed value W can then be 
determined by calculating the value of Z, as follows, which 
is distributed with zero mean and unit variance: 
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z 
(W ± .5 - Mw) 
(27) 
In the next phase, we seek to establish that 
(a) the 2 day CAR for the bidders can be explained by the 
explanatory variables relating to incentive and 
monitoring defined earlier, and 
(b) the model is structurally different for the HB, the HHW 
WK and the non-HHW WK. 
As a first step, we scrutinize the independent 
variables for multicollinearity by looking at the 
correlation matrix and the auxiliary regressions involving 
each of the explanatory variables as the dependent variable 
and the other two variables as independent variables. Next, 
we conduct a Chow test18 on the model to look for 
structural changes between the three groups in explaining 
the dependent variable. The test is conducted by first 
considering the model as unrestricted where the coefficients 
of the explanatory variables can take different values for 
the HB, the HHW WK and the non-HHW WK. In effect, we have 
three regression equations in the same variables with 
different values for the estimators of each of the 
coefficients in the three groups. The sum of the squared 
residuals from the mean of each of these regression 
equations, when added up, provides the residual sum of 
squares of the unrestricted model, RSSy. We then consider 
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the model as a restricted model by assuming that there is no 
difference between the three groups. This implies that the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables are identical 
across the three groups, and the corresponding regression 
can then be run on stacked data from all the three groups, 
treating the data as if they originate from the same 
population. The sum of the squared residuals from the mean 
of this regression equation yields the residual sum of 
squares of the restricted model, RSSr. The appropriate test 
statistic T to test the null hypothesis of no structural 
change is then given by: 
[(RSSr - RSSU)/2K] 
T = -R_-_u- (28) 
[RSS^ (n.,+n2+n3-3K) ] 
where K = number of regressors (including the 
intercept) 
n1 = number of observations for HHW WK 
n2 = number of observations for non-HHW WK 
n3 = number of observations for HB. 
The test statistic follows the F distribution with 2K 
numerator degrees of freedom and (n,,+n2+n3-3K) denominator 
degrees of freedom. 
The final model based on the results of the Chow Test 
is then tested for heteroskedasticity using White's test.19 
The test examines whether the error variance is affected by 
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any of the explanatory variables, their squares or their 
products. The test statistic is computed as the sample size 
N times the R2 from a regression of the squares of the 
residuals of the original regression equation as the 
dependent variable and the explanatory variables of the 
original regression, their squares and their products as the 
independent variables. The test statistic is asymptotically 
distributed as a chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to 
the number of regressors (not counting the constant) in the 
regression used to obtain the statistic. 
The next chapter details the results obtained through 
an analysis of the data as per the methodology elaborated 
above, and the extent of supporting evidence for the various 
hypotheses set out in Chapter 3. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. Tender offers are directly made to the target firm's 
shareholders who decide individually whether or not to 
tender their shares for sale to the bidding firm. 
Mergers are negotiated directly with the target's 
managers and approved by its board before going to a 
vote of its shareholders for approval. Proxy contests 
occur when an insurgent group attempts to gain 
controlling seats on the board of directors. 
2. All such subsequent bidders who are successful in 
acquiring the target are termed as WKs by Bradley, 
Desai and Kim (1988) . 
3. Mitchell and Lehn (1990) use a similar collection of 
firms in their sample selection of bidders. 
4. DJNS provides information from June 1979 onwards. We 
conduct the search using key expressions relating to 
White Knight transactions. 
5. Executive stock options, which are a part of deferred 
remuneration realizable in the near term horizon, have 
been considered as a separate variable. 
6. In an article on measuring executive compensation, 
Antle and Smith (1985) point out the difficulties of 
obtaining the closing inventory of executive stock 
options from company furnished public data, and 
recommend the need for the use of approximations in 
this regard - see Appendix B of their paper. 
7. In Corporate Finance. Ross And Westerfield (1987) 
calculate the average risk premium to be 8.6% for all 
stocks for the period 1926-1986 - p 128. 
8. The value of sJt2 is given by 
jt = s (1 + 1 + (I^-Rh)2/ 
Di 
°J(*W 
T = 1 
- 
where 
Sj2 = residual variance for security j from the market 
model regression, 
Dj = number of observations during the estimation 
period, 
RMt = rate of return on the market index for day t of 
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the event period, 
Rn = mean rate of return on the market index during 
the estimation period, and 
RMt = rate of return on the market for day r of the 
estimation period. 
9. Roll (1986) mentions that the market may not react to 
the immediate announcement of a bid since the bid may 
be anticipated, and may convey strategic information 
about the bidder other than that it is seeking a 
combination with a particular target. 
10. The measurement over extended intervals implicit in the 
formulation raises significant empirical issues. The 
larger the time intervals over which abnormal CARs are 
calculated, the farther one moves from the comparison 
period, and there can be problems with the stability of 
the beta used for predicting returns on which CARs are 
based. In this situation, the likelihood of extraneous 
firm-specific events creeping in is greater. While 
these difficulties are noteworthy, we believe that the 
robustness of the method, the economic magnitudes 
observed, and the absence of contradictory inferences 
will evidence the appropriateness of our use of the 
procedures. 
11. For a description of the Goldfeld-Quandt test, see 
Kmenta, Principles of Econometrics. 2nd Ed., 292-294. 
12. The equation is based on the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model, according to which 
E(Rj) = Rf + [E(Rm) - Rf] * (3.} 
A value of 0.0860 has been assigned to [E^) - Rf] 
based on historical data from 1926-1986. 
13. For calculating the expected income from executive 
stock options, the holding of options should properly 
be multiplied by the rate of return on the option, 
which is related to the rate of return on the 
underlying stock through the expression: 
[E(Rcj) - Rf] = n * [E(Rj) - Rf], where 
n = (aCj/Cj) -s- (aSj/Sj) 
E(Rj) = expected return on common stock. 
E(Rcj) = expected return on call option on the common 
stock. 
Rf = risk-free rate. 
Cj = value of call option on stock. 
Sj = value of stock. 
98 
Omega is defined as the option's elasticity. To 
facilitate the analysis, we assume that all the 
executive stock options have unit elasticity, resulting 
in the rate of return on the option being equal to the 
rate of return on the stock. This assumption is not 
unreasonable if we consider that the options are 
usually not deep out-of-the-money (in tune with their 
incentive feature) and have a relatively long time to 
expiration - see Cox and Rubinstein, Options Markets, 
pp. 185-193 and pp. 228-229. 
14. The method of Murphy (1985) and that of Smith and 
Zimmerman (1976), are both formulated to value 
executive stock options granted. We look upon all 
outstanding executive stock options on a particular 
date with a given weighted average exercise price as if 
the options were granted on that date with an exercise 
price equal to the given weighted average exercise 
price. This violates the assumption of Murphy (1985) 
that options are granted at an exercise price equal to 
the market price on the date of the grant. Accordingly, 
we have adopted the method of Smith and Zimmerman 
(1976) for valuing executive stock options. 
15. We assume constant payout over the life of the option. 
The variable 'd' is assumed to be the dividend paid in 
the year prior to the announcement of the event. 
16. For a description of the t-test, see Kmenta, Principles 
of Econometrics. 2nd ed., 145. 
17. The Wilcoxon test is a nonparametric test whose 
power-efficiency is close to 95% of the t-test even for 
moderate-sized samples. For a detailed description of 
the test, see Siegel and Castellan, Nonparametric 
Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences. 2nd Ed., 
128-137. 
18. For details on the construction of the Chow Test in 
different circumstances, and different ways of setting 
up the test, see Kmenta, Principles of Econometrics. 
2nd Ed., 420-422; Kennedy, A Guide to Econometrics. 2nd 
Ed., 87-88 and 186. 
19. For a detailed description of White's test and the 
related Breusch-Pagan test, see Kmenta, Principles 
of Econometrics. 2nd Ed., 294-296, and Kennedy, A Guide 
to Econometrics. 2nd Ed., 108. The Goldfeld-Quandt 
test was not used due to difficulties in identifying 
the explanatory variable with which the error term is 
correlated in the multiple regression context. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1 Results Relating to Bidding Behavior 
5.1.1 Review of Bidding Data 
Mergerstat Review, which tracks only successful WKs, 
yields 67 WKs for the period 1978-1987. These include 
preemptive friendly offers when target firms are expecting 
hostile bids,1 subsequent non-collaborative bids by "third 
parties" in multiple bidding situations, and subsequent 
collaborative (WK) bids by private firms. Dow Jones News 
Retrieval Service yields 266 cases, of which there are 33 
cases definitionally equivalent and non-overlapping to the 
cases from Mergerstat Review, except that they also 
incorporate unsuccessful cases. Thus, 100 control contests 
are identified from primary sources and subjected to the 
final definitional and data criteria for sample inclusion. 
After obtaining the short-list of 100 cases, the Wall 
Street Journal Index for the relevant years, and the actual 
Wall Street Journal articles are scrutinized to select the 
cases which conform to the definition of WKs stated at the 
beginning of Chapter 4. The manner of selection is detailed 
in Table 1 (on the next page). Exclusion of cases having 
confounding events lead to the final sample of 62 WK 
contests of which 57 involve exchange-listed firms.2 Three 
firms have each been WKs on two separate occasions. They 
are considered as six different cases, as there is no 
Table 1. 
Sample Selection from Control Contests 
Involving "White Knights" 
Description of column headings: 
EXCH :Subsequent collaborative bidders - exchange listed. 
PTC :Subsequent collaborative bidders - "over the counter". 
PVT :Subsequent collaborative bidders - private firms. 
PRE :Preemptive friendly offers when target is expecting a 
hostile bid - private firms indicated in brackets. 
NOCOL:Subsequent non-collaborative bidders in multiple 
bidding situations. 
CONF : Confounding events. 
NOINF:No information in Wall Street Journal Index. 
YEAR EXCH OTC PVT PRE NOCOL CONF NOINF TOTAL 
1978 1 1 — 2(1) 1 — 1 6 
1979 8 — — — 2 — — 10 
1980 9 — — 2(1) 1 1 — 13 
1981 10 — 1 — — 2 — 13 
1982 4 — 1 — — — — 5 
1983 5 — 1 — 1 — — 7 
1984 4 1 2 — — — — 7 
1985 9 1 2 1(1) — 1 — 14 
1986 5 1 7 3(2) — 1 1 18 
1987 2 1 4 — — — — 7 
57 5 18 8(5) 5 5 2 100 
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overlap in the time span of the contests (from the date of 
the first HB bid to the date of completion of the WK bid) 
for the WKs involved.3 For each of the 62 public WKs in 
the sample, the target is a public company. Ten targets are 
OTC firms and one is a Canadian firm. 
There are 62 HB cases corresponding to the WK sample, 
of which 57 are bids, four are proxy contests and three are 
open market purchases with hostile intent. 46 HBs in the 
sample contests are public companies, of which four are OTC 
firms. Over the entire ten year period of study, two of the 
HBs appear subsequently in other contests as a WK. None of 
the WKs appear as HBs in subsequent contests involving WKs. 
In terms of the bidding variations in these contests, 
there are 16 HHW WKs and 9 ASB WKs. In one instance, 
considered as part of the HHW process, the WK bid follows 
three consecutive bids by the HB (the bidding sequence being 
HHHW). Only one HHW WK overlaps with an ASB WK, i.e. the 
bidding sequence is HHWHW. For 7 ASB WKs, the sequential 
bidding (bidding sequence HW) occurs twice. In two other 
cases, it is repeated three times and four times 
respectively. 
5.1.2 Event Time Description 
The following event dates are identified when examining 
the results of control contests involving WKs: 
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HOSTILE BIDS 
D1 Date of first bid by HB. 
D1' Date of subsequent bid by the HB (in the HHW 
market process) following its own first bid D1. 
D.,' * Date of each subsequent bid by the HB following 
the WK bid - occurs in the ASB market process. 
WHITE KNIGHT BIDS 
D2 Date of first bid by WK. 
D2‘ Date of each subsequent bid by the WK following 
the HB bid - occurs in the ASB market process. 
D2'' Date of the last bid by the WK prior to the 
withdrawal of HB - occurs in the ASB market 
process. 
EVENT COMPLETION 
D3 Date of withdrawal of HB. 
D4 Date of completion of WK transaction.4 
In our empirical analysis, we focus our attention on 
two types of event windows, the fixed interval and the 
variable interval. In the tables describing the results, 
fixed intervals are denoted by (Dp-q, Dp) , where *p' is a 
number representing the appropriate event date as per the 
classification above, and 'q* represents the fixed interval. 
Variable intervals are represented by (Dp+1, Dr) , where 'p' 
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and 'r' are numbers representing the appropriate event dates 
bounding the contest-specific variable as per the 
classification above. 
The variable intervals (and their mean values in 
trading days denoted by /x) between the defined event dates 
can be related to the market process as follows: 
(D,+l, D2) The time taken by the WK to enter the 
contest, after its initiation (/x=27) . In the 
HHW environment, this interval needs to be 
further split into (D1+1,D1') and (D1,+1,D2) 
to examine the differential impact of the 
second HB bid. 
(d2+i, d3) The length of the auction process (/x=ll) . In 
the ASB environment, the differentiated 
impact of subsequent bids by HB and WK can be 
examined by considering each ASB as a 
sequential collection of standard bidding 
situations and splitting the interval into 
(D2+1,D11 ') , (D,"+1,D2') and (D2 • '+1, D3) .5 
(D, + l, D3) The time spent by the HB in the contest 
(M=38). 
(d2+i, d4) The time spent by the WK in the contest 
(M=46). 
(D,+l, D4) The length of the contest (/x=73) . 
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The average interval lengths indicate that the auction 
process, from the moment it is triggered by the WK bid, to 
the withdrawal of the HB, takes considerably less time than 
the control contest as a whole, with half of the auctions 
lasting 4 days or less. This makes it realistic to apply 
the intuition of the English auction while interpreting 
results.6 
However, in commenting upon the average lengths of 
intervals, we note that the averages are generally 
unrepresentative of typical control contest scenarios, due 
to large dispersions about the mean. For example, the 
length of the auction process ranges from 0 days (the HB 
withdraws on the same day that the WK makes its bid) to 81 
days (an ASB market process). The total length of the 
control contest process ranges from 17 days to 242 days. 
5.1.3 Control Features of HBs 
The relative sizes of the two categories of bidders in 
the control contest are examined. This is motivated by the 
premise that any wide disparity in this regard will 
complicate drawing conclusions based on a comparison of the 
market response to bids for the WK and the HB. For example, 
if one of the categories is considerably smaller than the 
other, the differential impact of potential resource-based 
constraints on the respective bidding behavior cannot be 
ignored. As a proxy for size, we use the market value of 
common equity for the firm two days prior to their first 
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bid, i.e. on day D^-2 and D2-2 for HBs and WKs respectively. 
As shown subsequently, the WKs have significant negative 
CARs for the interval D2-l to D2. The value of the WK on 
date D2-2 can thus be said to have preceded the impact of 
the WK bid, since there is little evidence of earlier 
security price reactions. 
Table 2 below shows the size distribution of WKs and 
HBs respectively based on identified value ranges. For each 
Table 2. 
Comparison of Size Profiles of "White Knights11 
and Hostile Bidders 
Value 
Range 
“WHITE KNIGHTS” fN=57) 
Propor- Mean negative 
tion(%) CAR CAR(%) 
HOSTILE BIDDERS(N=42) 
Propor- Mean negative 
tion(%) CAR CAR(%) 
($/mil) 
< 500 32 - 2.1 67 40 - 0.7 59 
500 to 16 
1000 
1000 to 37 
5000 
> 5000 15 
- 3.7 89 
- 3.5 86 
- 4.7a 77a 
21 - 0.9 66 
33 + 1.5 55 
6 - 1.7 100 
The "white knights" in this value range include Dow 
Chemical Co., which is really one of the outliers with 
a strong dollar gain different from the pattern 
observed in other "white knights". As such, these 
numbers have a positive bias. 
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of the value ranges, the table also shows the distribution 
of positive and negative CARs and the mean two day CAR 
ending on the date of their first bid. Three distinct 
conclusions can be drawn from this table. 
(i) The WKs are generally comparable in size to the HBs, 
although they tend to be slightly larger. As such, it 
is appropriate to compare the market response to the 
two categories of bidders to strengthen our 
interpretation of the event study results. 
(ii) The average two day CARs for WKs ending with their 
first bid are notably negative. On the other hand, the 
average two day CARs for HBs ending with their bids are 
mixed, with the average two day CAR for a relatively 
large size category of HBs being positive. The profile 
for HBs is consistent with the inconclusive results 
obtained by researchers examining bidder returns in 
takeovers. 
(iii) The average negative CAR for the WK portfolio tends to 
increase as firm size increases. This is consistent 
with the notion that a larger size can imply greater 
potential for agency conflict. 
5.1.4 Overall Results 
Table 3 (on next page) reports the abnormal return (AR) 
and the CAR (beginning at D2-10) for each of the 10 days in 
the interval ending with D2, and also the CAR for three 
fixed time intervals relative to D2. The results in panel A 
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Table 3 
Abnormal Return (AR) and Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
for "White Knights11 for the Event Period -9 Trading Days to 
+10 Trading Days from its Bid Date 
(N=57) 
PANEL A: 
AR = daily average market-adjusted abnormal return. 
CAR' = cumulative sum of the daily average abnormal return. 
Date in ar m CAR' (%) (t-statis 
event time 
- 9 0.08 0.08 0.25 
- 8 - 0.02 0.06 - 0.07 
- 7 0.05 0.11 0.15 
- 6 0.13 0.26 0.39 
- 5 - 0.03 0.23 - 0.10 
- 4 0.11 0.34 0.32 
- 3 0.06 0.40 0.18 
- 2 - 0.18 0.22 - 0.54 
- 1 - 1.59 - 1.37 - 5.41 
0 - 1.72 - 3.09 - 5.97 
** 
kk 
a=0.01 
PANEL B. 
CAR = mean cumulative abnormal return 
Period in 
event time 
CAR m (Z-statistic) 
- 1 to 0 
+ 1 to + 5 
+ 1 to + 10 
3.31 
0.11 
0.33 
kk 
- 11.75 
- 0.12 
0.52 
a=0.01. 
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show that the excess returns are sharply negative at D2-l 
and D2. Also, the t-statistic for D2-l and D2 is significant 
even at a=0.01, thereby rejecting the null hypothesis that 
the abnormal returns on the event date are zero. From panel 
B of the table, we observe that the Z-scores for the CARs 
for intervals (D2+l, D2+5) and (D2+l, D2+10) are 
insignificant. In panel A, the t-statistics for ARs prior to 
D2“l are also seen to be insignificant. From these results 
we can make three inferences. 
(i) There seems to be little leakage of information 
regarding the impending bid of the WK. There is a 
significant average CAR of -3.3% from D2-l to D2 and no 
evidence of material reaction before, as against a 
significant average CAR of -2.6% between D1 and D2, as 
shown in Table 4 (on the next page). 
(ii) There is no recovery of the losses immediately after 
the WK bid, with the average CAR being insignificant at 
+0.3% between D2+l and D2+10. Since the average length 
of the auction is 11 days (median 4 days), this lends 
support to the notion that the negative reaction of the 
WK shareholders is unaffected by the outcome of the 
contest. 
(iii) If the WK bid at D2 is perceived as an antitakeover 
strategy by the WK, then the negative reaction of the 
market is quite consistent with market reaction to most 
other antitakeover strategies where stockholder 
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Table 4. 
CARS for "White Kniahts" and Hostile Bidders; 
Selected Intervals 
"WHITE KNIGHTS" HOSTILE BIDDERS 
IHi H571 fN=42) 
Interval CAR r %) % negative CAR (% ) % neaative 
CAR CAR 
D,,-50 , D, - 1.9 54.39 0.8 50.00 
Dr4, D1 0.7 50.88 
„ _ * 
1.8 47.50 
Drl, D, - 0.2 52.63 0.1 60.00 
d2-i, °2 
_ ** 
- 3.3 77.19 1.3** 42.86 
D,+l, D2 
•tele 
- 2.6 68.42 3.1** 47.50 
d2+i, D3 - 1.1 48.98 - 2.1* 64.86 
d2+i. D4 - 1.9 49.09 
_a _a 
D,+l, D4 - 5.6** 61.40 
_a _a 
a=0.01. 
* a=0.10. 
3 For hostile bidders, the transaction is completed on 
when they (or the unsuccessful "white knights") 
withdraw from the contest. 
approval is not required (Jarrell, Brickley and Netter, 
1988).7 
Further strong evidence of negative returns for the WK 
is evident from the percentage of positive and negative 
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returns, for the intervals including D2, as reported in 
Table 4 (on previous page). This reveals that over the 
interval (D2-l, D2) , 77.2% of the average CARs among WK 
firms are negative. 43.9% of the average CARs are 
significantly negative at a=0.10 (22.81% at a=0.01). In 
contrast, only 22.8% of average CARs among firms are 
positive. 1.75% of these CARs are positive and significant 
at a=0.10 (0% at a=0.01).8 It is noteworthy that of the 13 
WK firms (22.8%) that show positive CARs, 7 WKs enter the 
bidding process after two bids by the HB (HHW), two are 
White Squires (see footnote 3 in Chapter 1) for whom the 
bids are perhaps more in the nature of an investment and 
there is no intention to acquire control, and two WKs (one 
overlapping with HHW) are unsuccessful HBs in prior contests 
involving other WKs. This last category is thus presumably 
firms with acquisition plans awaiting implementation. For 
the firms having negative CARs, there are no White Squires 
or WKs who are unsuccessful HBs in prior control contests 
involving WKs. This is consistent with the notion that the 
managers of the WK may not be acting in the best interests 
of the shareholders when making their bid for the target. 
From the CARs for the variable length intervals, we 
further note that a significant negative CAR for the 
portfolio of all WKs occurs only in intervals including the 
2 day window from D2-l to D2. Also, intervals including 
(D2-l, D2) but longer than that two day window show 
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significant negative average CARs larger than that for the 
two day window, implying that there is no prior gain or 
subsequent recovery of the losses incurred from D2-l to D2. 
The pattern is essentially the same for the subsample of 
successful WKs. In a statistical sense, we can thus 
conclude that overall, shareholders of WK firms do lose on 
announcement of the WK bid, which is not a loss of prior 
gains, and is not recovered up to the completion of the 
contest. These results enable us to focus primarily on the 
two day window from D2-l to D2, to study differences in 
return vectors based on structural differences in the 
bidding process. 
As far as the HBs are concerned, it is apparent from 
Table 2 (on page 106) that the negative CARs for HBs in most 
size intervals are smaller than the negative CARs for 
equivalent sized WKs. Also, for the control sample of HBs, 
the proportion of positive CARs for the two day interval 
prior to and including their first bid on D1 (40%) is much 
larger than that in the sample of WKs for the two day 
interval prior to and including their first bid at D2 (22%). 
The CAR profile for the overall control HB group during and 
after their bid is also reported in Table 4 (on page 110).9 
Interestingly, Table 4 reveals a completely different 
pattern regarding the abnormal return structure for the HBs, 
when compared to the WK bidders. In contrast to the market 
reaction around the WK bid, there is no impact for the HB 
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bid in the interval (D^l, D1), and a significant average 
positive CAR of +1.8% from 0^4 to D1. There is a further 
gain between D^l and D2, with a significant average 
positive CAR of +3.1% during this period. The proportion of 
average positive CARs is higher, and the difference between 
percentage of positive and negative CARs is not as 
pronounced as for WKs. The WK bid at D2 causes a 
significant positive reaction for HB stock values. From 
auction theory, the higher WK bid signifies that the value 
of the firm is at least as much as the HB bid for it (the 
next highest bid). This information likely causes the 
market to react positively. However, the situation changes 
after the WK bid. The prior gains of the HBs seem to 
dissipate, with a significant negative CAR of -2.1% between 
D2+l and D3. The return pattern of the HBs is similar to 
that of bidders for whom hostile takeover bids failed, as 
reported by Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983). As noted in 
their work, gain to bidders from hostile bids, based on 
synergistic possibilities, dissipated as it became clearer 
that the targets may not be taken over. 
Overall, nothing material happens regarding HB abnormal 
returns over the period D1 to D3, and gradual gains up to 
the WK bid are lost subsequently. The contrast between the 
HB effects and the WK bid outcome (where losses up to D2 are 
sustained up to D3) , provides evidence of the differing 
motivations of the HB and WK bidders in control contests. 
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5.1.5 Results for HHW WKs 
The market responses to WK participation when the WK 
bids after two consecutive HB bids (HHW market process), are 
shown in Table 5 (on next page).10 The complementary 
situation of market response during identical fixed and 
variable intervals for WKs who bid immediately after a HB 
bid (non-HHW WKs), is shown alongside the corresponding CARs 
for the HHW WKs. A scrutiny of the results over the 
relevant fixed and variable intervals indicates strong 
support for the "Correlated Values" Hypothesis. The HHW WKs 
suffer a much smaller negative reaction, in percentage 
terms, than their counterparts. Around the WK bid, the 
abnormal negative CAR for WKs in the HHW process is less 
than that for non-HHW WKs. Between D1 and D2, and also over 
the entire length of the contest, the non-HHW WKs have 
significant negative returns, whereas the CARs for the HHW 
WKs over these same intervals are not significantly 
different from zero. Also, for the two day interval around 
the WK bid, non-HHW WKs have a substantially larger number 
of negative abnormal returns (85.37%, with 51.22% being 
significant at a=0.10) than the HHW WKs (56.25%,11 with 
25.00% being significant at a=0.10). Finally, the two day 
positive CAR portfolio for WKs consists of 54% of the HHW 
WKs and 13% of the non-HHW WKs. The latter goes down to 7% 
if we exclude non-HHW WKs who are identifiably following an 
investment strategy. 
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Table 5 
CARs for the Set of "White Knights'1 Where its First Bid is 
Preceded bv Two Consecutive Hostile Bids (HHW Process); and 
the Complementary Set of “White Knights" (NON-HHW Process) 
Selected Intervals 
"WHITE KNIGHTS" 
HHW PROCESS 
(N=16) 
NON-HHW PROCESS 
(N=41) 
Interval CAR(%) % neaative 
CAR 
CAR(%) % necrat: 
CAR 
D.j-50, - 1.6 56.25 - 2.1 53.66 
Dr4, D1 1.6 50.00 0.3 51.22 
Drl, D1 - 0.9 50.00 0.0 53.66 
D/-4, D,' 3.5** 21.25 
_a _a 
V1' Dl' 2.6** 25.00 
_a _a 
d2-i, D2 - 1.0** 56.25 - 4.1** 
85.37 
D,+lf V 1.4 43.75 
_a _a 
D/+1, °2 - 5.4** 68.75 
_a _a 
D,+l, D2 - 4.0 68.75 
_ ** 
- 2.0 68.29 
d2+i, D3 - 1.2 50.00 - 1.1 48.57 
d2+i. D4 1.4 31.25 - 3.2 56.41 
D^l, D4 - 3.8 62.50 - 6.2** 
60.98 
a=0.01 
The event date D1' does not exist for non-HHW 
processes. 
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The significantly positive reaction of the HHW WKs to 
the second bid of the HB, as seen from Table 5 (on previous 
page), is difficult to explain, unless the possibility of 
some leakage of information is admitted. Thus, in the HHW 
market process where the control contest is well under way 
with the first HB bid, the market may become aware of the 
identity of the WK firm as a potential bidder. The second 
bid of the HB will then signify (in the context of 
"correlated" values) a higher value for the target, as it 
will most likely be the second highest bid of the auction. 
This additional information about the value of the target, 
being made available to the WK through the second HB bid, 
can enable the WK to make a more "appropriate" bid if it 
chose to do so. We offer this as a possible explanation as 
to why the market reacts favorably regarding the WK stock 
price when the second HB bid is made, in contests 
subsequently identified to be HHW contests. The longer HHW 
process can also imply more information flow to the market. 
Since firms have resisted once, the market may expect a WK 
and have identified possible WK candidates. The entry of 
the WK can then be less of a surprise, and this additionally 
explains why there is less negative reaction over the two 
day window ending D2 for HHW WKs, as compared to non-HHW 
WKs. 
Table 6 below reports the results of the regression 
model specified in equation (1) in Chapter 3. The 
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F-statistic is significant at a=0.01. We are unable to 
reject homoscedasticity using the Goldfeld-Quandt test. The 
estimator of the coefficient of the dummy variable 
representing HHW market process is positive and significant, 
providing further support to the "Correlated Values" 
Table 6. 
Multiple Regression to Evaluate the Impact of the HHW Market 
Process and the Time Between the "White Knight" Bid and the 
preceding Hostile Bid on the Two Day CAR Ending on the Date 
of the "White Knight" Bid 
(N=57) 
Explanatory Variables: 
D = 1, if WK bid follows 2 HB bids (HHW process). 
= 0 otherwise (sequential bidding between HB and WK). 
T = time interval between WK bid and prior HB bid. 
Dependent variable: 
CAR = two day market adjusted mean cumulative abnormal 
return for the WK ending on the date of its first 
bid. 
MODEL: 
CAR = a + B1 * D + B2*T + € 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT VALUE t-STATISTIC 
CONSTANT a - 0.0519 - 6.15 
D bi 0.0335 2.99 
T 0.0005 1.85 
Adjusted R2 = 0.14 
hypothesis. The negative and significant estimator of the 
intercept, larger than the positive estimator for the DUMMY 
coefficient, shows that the CAR is likely to be negative, 
and this will be reduced if the WK bid is under the HHW 
process. The estimator of the coefficient of the variable T 
is also positive and significant, indicating that better 
appraisal of the target reduces the probability of 
overpayment. For a sufficiently long time interval, the CAR 
may also be positive. Solving the equation yields a 
critical time interval of 36.8 days for the CAR to be zero 
for the WKs under the HHW process. For the WKs under the 
non-HHW process, this critical time interval goes up to 
103.8 days. In the sample, the mean interval for the HHW 
WKs is calculated to be 17 days after the second HB bid. 
The same mean for non-HHW WKs is 24 days. The likelihood of 
a positive CAR is thus seen to be more in the case of WKs 
under the HHW process. 
5.1.6 Results for ASB WKs 
All WKs in the ASB market process are successful in 
acquiring the targets. The market reaction for these WKs 
during the relevant variable intervals, and corresponding 
results for the control sample of HBs, are presented in 
Table 7 next. 
It is evident from the results reported in the table 
that for the ASB market process, the Repetition Hypothesis 
is strongly supported. Every subsequent bid of the WK is 
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Table 7. 
CARs for the Set of "White Knights11 and Hostile Bidders 
Where the First "White Knight11 Bid is Followed bv One or 
More Sequences of Hostile and “White Knight” Bidding (ASB 
Process) ; and the Complementary Set of "White Knights11 and 
Hostile Bidders (NON-ASB Process); Selected Intervals 
"WHITE KNIGHTS" HOSTILE BIDDERS 
(N=9a) INz l6!1 
Interval CAR Percent CAR Percent 
ASB PROCESS: 
1%1 neaative 
CAR 
Ill neaative 
CAR 
d2+i, Dj 7.6** 71.78 - 1.1 50.00 
d2+i, V 0.1 50.00 - 1.1 62.50 
D, * '+1/ D2' 2.7** 63.64 1.3 18.18 
d2"+i, d3 
NON-ASB PROCESSb: 
4.7** 87.50 - 2.0 85.71 
d2+i, d3 
a=0.01. 
a=0.10. 
0.4 42.50 - 2.3* 67.74 
The existence of more than one follow up sequence of 
hostile and "white knight" bids in 2 ASB contests led 
respectively to a total of 12 observations in the 
analysis of "white knights" and 8 observations in the 
analysis of hostile bidders. 
There are 48 "white knights" and 36 hostile bidders 
in this category. 
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met by strong disapproval from the market, indicated by the 
significant CAR of -2.7% for the WKs over the interval from 
subsequent HB bids to subsequent WK bids (i.e., D^'+l to 
D2'). There is a further significant loss of 4.7% after the 
last WK bid, until the HB withdraws. These findings suggest 
that after the resolution of all uncertainty as to whether 
it will prevail, the market gives the WK a final penalty for 
its "victory" in the contest. In the interval (D2+l, D3) , 
the significant negative CAR for the ASB WKs is -7.6%, which 
can be readily contrasted with the absence of any 
significant reaction during this interval for the non-ASB 
WKs [CAR = +0.4 (z=1.06 - not reported in the Table)]. In 
contrast, from the summary of the ASB market process for HBs 
in Table 7, we observe no significant reaction on the HB to 
any of the subsequent bids, whether made by the HB or by the 
WK. 
The evidence cited above illustrates that grouping all 
subsequent bids in one category as multiple bidding 
situations may be misleading if there is no control for the 
characteristics of the firms making the bids. In the ASB 
market process, both the HB and the WK make subsequent bids. 
The subsequent bids have no significant impact on the HB, 
irrespective of which bidder makes the subsequent bid. 
However, the impact on the WK is determined by the firm 
making the subsequent bid. If it happens to be the WK, 
there is a strong negative reaction, as in the case of its 
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first bid. However, if the HB makes the subsequent bid, the 
WK remains essentially unaffected. This result further 
suggests that the motivations for the WK bid are likely to 
be different from the motivations for the HB bid. 
5.2 Results Relating to Managerial Motivation 
5.2.1 Review of Observed Data 
In carrying out the analysis on managerial motivation, 
it is observed that proxy statements containing information 
on executive compensation and executive holdings of stock 
and stock options are not filed by firms incorporated in 
foreign countries whose stocks traded on the exchange 
through American Depository Receipts (ADRs). There are two 
such firms in the sample of WKs (neither is involved in a 
HHW or an ASB bidding process) and one such firm in the 
sample of HBs. These are excluded from our study. Two 
other firms in the sample of HBs incorporate as public 
companies for less than one year before they bid for the 
target in a hostile manner, and annual executive 
compensation data is accordingly not available. There are 
thus 55 WKs (of which 16 are HHW WKs) and 39 HBs remaining 
in the sample. 
Table 8 (on next page) provides a distribution of the 
types of reporting of executive stock options in proxy 
statements by the different bidders. No systematic 
difference is observed in type of reporting between WKs and 
HBs. Additionally, the panel relating to time distribution 
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Table 8 
Types of Reporting of Executive Stock Options 
in Proxv Statements 
DISTRIBUTION AMONG BIDDERS: 
"WHITE KNIGHTS " HOSTILE BIDDERS TOTAL 
(N=55) (N =39) (N=94) 
TYPE I 20 15 35 
TYPE II 14 11 25 
TYPE III 7 5 12 
TYPE IV 8 5 13 
NO OPTIONS 6 3 9 
TIME DISTRIBUTION: 
1978-80 1981-84 1985-87 TOTAL 
(N=94) 
TYPE I 30 4 1 35 
TYPE II 1 24 0 25 
TYPE III 0 2 10 12 
TYPE IV 0 1 12 13 
NO OPTIONS 3 5 1 9 
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clearly demonstrates that the type of reporting chosen by 
the bidder is a function of time. In the time period over 
which the sample of bidders is chosen, Type I reporting 
prevails in the period 1978-1980. Type II reporting is 
dominant in the period 1981-1984. The period 1985-1987 sees 
the prevalence of type III and type IV reporting. 
A further scrutiny of executive stock options reveals 
that six WKs and three HBs have no executive stock options 
outstanding. No systematic pattern, industry-based or 
otherwise, can be noted in such exclusion of executive stock 
option plans. For the purposes of our analysis, the value 
of outstanding stock options held by principal executive 
officers in these firms is assumed to be zero. Aside from 
firms with no executive stock options, the application of 
the methodology for valuation yields positive dollar values 
for the lower valuation bound of options outstanding for all 
WKs and all but one HB. For this one HB, the value of the 
lower bound of the option is negative due to an extremely 
low stock price at the time of the contest. In our analysis, 
the value of the option for this firm is assumed to be zero. 
We first look at the descriptive statistics for the 
observed variables, as reported in Table 9 (on next page). 
The mean annual cash and cash-equivalent remuneration to 
principal executive officers and their mean beneficial 
ownership of stock is higher for WKs than for HBs. The WK 
firm also has more debt and a larger market value of common 
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equity. However, the HB firms have their principal 
executive officers holding a larger amount of outstanding 
executive stock options than their counterparts in the WK 
firms. 
Table 9. 
Descriptive Statistics of Annual Cash and Cash-Equivalent 
Remuneration of Managers, Beneficial Stock and Stock Option 
Ownership bv Managers, Book Value of Firm Debt and Market 
Value of Firm Equity for "White Knights*1 and Hostile Bidders 
on a Date Immediately Preceding the Contest 
($/million) 
"WHITE KNIGHT" HOSTILE BIDDER 
(N=55) (N=39) 
MEAN STANDARD MEAN STANDARD 
DEVIATION DEVIATION 
Managerial 
Remuneration 
4.70 2.30 3.30 2.35 
Managerial 
Stockholdings 
121.61 486.32 69.34 129.97 
Managerial 5.37 
Options holdings 
7.44 9.49 18.64 
Aggregate 
Firm Debt 
827.24 1265.34 681.58 1170.20 
Aggregate 
Firm Equity 
2178.20 2808.47 1349.10 2882.10 
Table 10 (on next page) shows the correlation matrix of 
these observed variables for the entire sample of bidders 
(WKs and HBs). Cash and cash-equivalent remuneration is 
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found to be positively correlated with market value of 
common equity (r=0.6). If the market value of common equity 
is deemed to be a proxy for the size of the firm, this 
result reinforces the findings in the relevant empirical 
literature (described in chapter 2) regarding the strong 
Table 10. 
Correlation Matrix of Annual Cash and Cash-Ecruivalent 
Remuneration of Managers, Beneficial Stock and Stock Option 
Ownership bv Managers, Book Value of Firm Debt and Market 
Value of Firm Equity for “White Knights" and Hostile Bidders 
on a Date Immediately Preceding the Contest 
Remuneration! 1.00 
Stock 0.07 1.0 
Option 0.18 0.06 1.00 
Debt 0.43 - 0.02 0.19 1.00 
Equity 0.60 0.24 0.21 0.42 1.00 
Remuneration Stock Option Debt Equity 
empirical relationship between executive cash compensation 
and firm size, and provides strength to the premises of our 
hypotheses regarding managerial motivation. 
5.2.2 Analysis of Difference Between Groups 
From the primary data collected, three key 
variables COM, OP and DEQ are defined (as explained in 
chapter 3) which enable us to generate the hypotheses in 
testable terms. COM and OP are termed as the INCENTIVE 
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VARIABLES as they directly affect managerial behavior 
through the incentive structure. DEQ is termed as the 
MONITORING VARIABLE since it is expected to affect 
managerial behavior indirectly through the intensity of the 
monitoring of managerial action by others. 
COM can be interpreted as the expected annual income of 
principal executive officers from their direct and 
beneficial ownership of part of the common equity of the 
firm, relative to their annual cash income from cash and 
cash-equivalent remuneration. Higher values of COM will 
thus imply a greater alignment with the interests of the 
stockholders for maximization of managerial utility and 
firm-value maximizing behavior. Lower values of COM can 
imply that cash and cash-equivalent remuneration is the 
incentive primarily motivating the decision making by 
managers, making size maximization dominate firm-value 
maximization. 
OP can be interpreted as the expected annual income of 
principal executive officers from their holdings of 
outstanding (unexercised and unexpired) stock options, 
relative to their annual cash income from cash and cash- 
equivalent remuneration. Stock options have two 
consequences in this context. 
(i) They are deferred compensation, whose discounted 
present value is being used for purposes of 
valuation.12 The ratio OP, in some sense, thus 
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measures the importance assigned by managers to 
expected income in the near-term horizon as contrasted 
with current cash income. 
(ii) The valuation of stock options is positively 
related to the riskiness of the stock. The ratio OP 
will thus indicate, in some sense, the relative degree 
of risk aversion by managers. A higher OP will imply 
that managers are less risk averse, and are prepared to 
take the normal business risks in their decision-making 
which are necessary for earning normal returns for the 
firm. On the other hand, a lower value of OP may imply 
a lower propensity on the part of managers to undertake 
normal business risk. They may thus be motivated, to a 
greater extent, to diversify their own employment risk 
through size maximization (Amihud and Lev, 1981). 
DEQ is a variation of the traditional debt equity 
ratio, and the mode of construction of the variable 
deliberately excludes preferred stock for ease of 
interpretation in the context of the study. Preferred stock 
is a hybrid security, and it may have some monitoring 
implications for some firms and none for others. The book 
value of debt is preferred to its market value, as 
significant amounts of corporate debt in the sample are 
privately placed. The variable, though not ideal in that 
the preferred stock component of the capital structure along 
with its monitoring implications is not considered, and 
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market value is not used for corporate debt wherever 
available, is the best suited to fulfil our objectives in 
the context of the study. A higher value of DEQ will imply 
relatively larger holdings of debt, and less "free" cash 
flow available to managers. There will also be better 
monitoring of the managers' behavior, which will act as a 
disincentive for non-value maximizing behavior.13 In 
contrast, lower values of DEQ may enable managers to act 
without any constraints, for maximization of their own 
utility. 
We analyze the differences between the measures of 
central tendency for the following pairs of groups, to draw 
inferences regarding the motivation of their managers. 
(i) WKs and HBs. 
(ii) HHW WKs and non-HHW WKs. 
(iii) ASB WKs and non-ASB WKs. 
(iv) HHW WKs and HBs. 
(v) NON-HHW WKs and HBs. 
Table 11 (on next page) provides the results of the 
t-tests and Wilcoxon tests for differences of the mean 
values of COM, OP and DEQ for the WKs and HBs. Both OP and 
DEQ are observed to be significantly higher, as posited in 
our hypothesis. We are unable to establish a significant 
difference for COM based on the parametric t-test, though 
the non-parametric Wilcoxon test does provide evidence to 
this effect. Thus, on the average, HBs have significantly 
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Table 11. 
T-Test and Wilcoxon Test for Differences Between Measures of 
Central Tendency of Constructed Variables COM, OP, DEO and 
MGR for the Two Groups: "White Knights” and Hostile Bidders 
"WHITE KNIGHT" HOSTILE BIDDER t-STATISTIC WILCOXON 
(N= =55) (N=39) (Z) 
MEAN STAND. 
DEV. 
MEAN 
^2 
STAND. 
DEV. 
COM 5.74 25.86 3.98 6.22 0.41 - 2.50** 
OP 0.20 0.28 0.67 1.58 - 2.15** - 1.09 
DEQ 0.64 0.90 1.25 1.51 - 2.46** - 2.13* 
MGR 0.08 0.13 0.15 0.17 - 2.43** 
_ _ _** 
- 3.07 
a=0.01. 
a=0.10. 
higher relative levels of debt in their capital structure, 
and a relatively higher level of expected income from 
outstanding stock and options compared to their cash income. 
Table 12 (on next page) provides the results of the 
t-tests and Wilcoxon tests for differences of the mean 
values of COM, OP and DEQ for the WKs under the HHW process 
and the WKs under the non-HHW process. We observe here that 
COM is significantly higher (at a=0.10) for the HHW WKs as 
compared to the non-HHW WKs, which is a direct evidence of 
the significantly lower incentive of HHW managers to engage 
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Table 12. 
T-Test and Wilcoxon Test for Differences Between Measures of 
Central Tendency of Constructed Variables COM, OP. DEO and 
MGR for the Two Groups: “White Knights11 Under the HHW Market 
Process and "White Knights" Under the Non-HHW Market Process 
HHW PROCESS NON-HHW PROCESS t-STATISTIC WILCOXON 
(N =16) (N =39) (Z) 
MEAN STAND. MEAN STAND. 
Mi DEV. m2 DEV. 
COM 15.50 47.42 1.74 2.51 1.83* 1.84* 
OP 0.27 0.40 0.17 0.22 1.26 0.41 
DEQ 0.73 1.40 0.60 0.60 0.46 - 1.07 
MGR 0.12 0.20 0.06 0.10 1.47 1.03 
* 
a=0.10. 
in ] non firm- value maximizing behavior as compared to the 
managers of non-HHW WKs.14 We are unable to support our 
hypotheses of significantly higher levels of OP and DEQ for 
HHW WKs. 
Table 13 below provides the results of the t-tests and 
Wilcoxon tests for differences of mean values of WKs under 
the ASB market process and WKs under the non-ASB market 
process. No significant differences are observed in any of 
the constructed variables, which confirms our view (as 
stated in chapter 3) that partitions based on bidding 
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Table 13. 
T-Test and Wilcoxon Test for Differences Between Measures of 
Central Tendency of Constructed Variables COM. OP. DEO and 
MGR for the Two Groups: "White Knights” Under the ASB Market 
Process and "White Knicrhts" Under the Non-ASB Market Process 
ASB PROCESS NON-ASB PROCESS t-STATISTIC WILCOXON 
(N=9) (N= =46) (Z) 
MEAN STAND MEAN STAND. 
Mi DEV. m2 DEV. 
COM 1.40 2.44 6.59 28.23 - 0.55 - 1.22 
OP 0.14 0.09 0.21 0.30 - 0.73 0.35 
DEQ 0.45 0.35 0.68 0.97 - 0.68 - 0.32 
MGR 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.15 - 1.05 - 0.27 
behavior after the first bids cannot be predicated on 
divergent incentive related motives of managers. 
Table 14 (on next page) and Table 15 (on page 133) list 
results which provide strong indirect empirical evidence for 
our principal construct. From Table 14, we observe that none 
of the constructed variables COM, OP, and DEQ are different 
across the two groups of HHW WKs and HBs,15 implying the 
likelihood of similar manager motivations across these two 
groups. From Table 15, we observe that all the constructed 
variables are significantly higher for the HBs as contrasted 
to the group of non-HHW WKs. Thus, manager motivations are 
likely to be different for HBs and non-HHW WKs and similar 
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Table 14. 
T-Test and Wilcoxon Test for Differences Between Measures of 
Central Tendency of Constructed Variables COM, OP, DEO and 
MGR for the Two Groups: “White Knights” Under the HHW Market 
Process and Hostile Bidders 
"WHITE KNIGHT" HOSTILE BIDDER t -STATISTIC WILCOXON 
HHW 
(N 
PROCESS 
=16) (N=39) (MrM2) (Z) 
MEAN 
Mi 
STAND. 
DEV. 
MEAN 
m2 
STAND. 
DEV. 
COM 15.50 47.42 3.98 6.22 1.51 - 0.44 
OP 0.27 0.40 0.67 1.58 - 0.98 - 0.44 
DEQ 0.73 1.40 1.25 1.51 - 1.19 - 1.97* 
MGR 0.12 0.20 0.15 0.17 - 0.67 - 1.34 
★ 
a=0.10. 
for HBs and HHW WKs. If we assume that managers of HBs act 
in a firm value maximizing manner, then by implication, 
managers of HHW WKs will have similar incentives to act in a 
firm value maximizing manner and managers of non-HHW firms 
will likely act in a non value maximizing manner. 
In terms of the hypotheses listed in Chapter 3 (pages 
62-67), the results in Tables 11-13 evidence empirical 
support for hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4, & 7. We are unable to 
establish the validity of hypotheses 5 & 6 from the results 
in Table 12, though the results in Tables 14 & 15 do provide 
an indirect indication of their appropriateness. 
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Table 15. 
T-Test and Wilcoxon Test for Differences Between Measures of 
Central Tendency of Constructed Variables COM, OP. DEO and 
MGR for the Two Groups: "White Knights” Under the Non-HHW 
Process and Hostile Bidders 
“WHITE KNIGHT" HOSTILE BIDDER t-STATISTIC WILCOXON 
NON-HHW PROCESS 
(N =39) (N= =39) (Z) 
MEAN STAND. 
DEV. 
MEAN STAND. 
DEV. 
COM 1.74 2.51 3.98 6.22 - 2.09** - 3.02** 
OP 0.17 0.22 0.67 1.58 - 1.94* - 1.18 
DEQ 0.60 0.60 1.25 1.51 - 2.48** - 1.70* 
MGR 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.17 - 2.97** 
_ _ 
— 3.26 
** 
* 
a=0.01. 
a=0.10. 
5.2. 3 Cross-sectional Relationships 
We next endeavor to explain the variation in market 
reaction to bids by the bidding firms (measured by the two 
day CARs) due to variations in the managerial incentive and 
monitoring disincentive variables COM, OP and DEQ. Table 16 
(on next page) reports the results of testing the 
explanatory variables for multicollinearity. It can be seen 
from the table that the three independent variables are not 
correlated with one another. The auxilliary regressions 
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Table 16. 
Detection of Multicollinearity; 
Correlation Matrix of Constructed Variables COM, OP, DEO; 
and Auxiliary Regressions with Each of the Variables COM, 
OP, DEO as the Dependent Variable and the Other Two as 
Explanatory Variables 
CORRELATION MATRIX 
COM 1.00 
OP 0.04 1.00 
DEQ - 0.08 0.00 1.00 
MGR 0.40 - 0.04 0.14 1.00 
COM OP DEQ MGR 
AUXILIARY REGRESSIONS 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLE 
-(2,91) R2 ESTIMATED 
COEFFICIENT 
t 
1. COM OP 0.40 l o
 
• o
 
H
 
0.8 0.4 
DEQ -1.4 -0.8 
2. OP COM 0.08 -0.02 0.002 0.4 
DEQ 0.004 0.04 
3. DEQ OP 0.31 l o
 
• o
 
N)
 
-0.005 -0.78 
DEQ 0.005 0.04 
reveal that any two of the variables together are not 
correlated with the third explanatory variable. 
Table 17 (on next page) reports the results of the Chow 
test for structural differences between the HHW WKs, the 
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Table 17. 
Chow Test for Structural Differences Between the Three 
Groups of Bidding Firms viz. Hostile Bidders. "White 
Knights” Under the HHW Process, and "White Knights" Under 
the Non-HHW Process, in Explaining the Two Day CAR Ending on 
the Date of the Bid Through the Constructed Explanatory 
Variables COM. OP. DEO 
MODEL: CAR = a + B^COM + B2*OP + B3*DEQ + € 
UNRESTRICTED MODEL: 
Sum of squared residuals: 
hostile bidders = 0.072047 
"white knights" under HHW process = 0.024121 
"white knights" under non-HHW process= 0.048321 
Unrestricted sum of squares = 0.144489 
RESTRICTED MODEL: 
Sum of squared residuals = 0.174770 
F(8,90) 
2.14 
* 
a=0.05. 
non-HHW WKs and the HBs in explaining the variation in two 
day CARs through the constructed managerial incentive and 
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Table 18. 
Multiple Regression to Evaluate the Impact of the 
Constructed Variables COM, OP AND DEO for all Bidders, and 
the Differential Impact of "White Knights” Under the HHW 
Process and the "White Knights” Under the Non-HHW Process. 
on the Two Day CAR Ending on the Date of the Bid 
Explanatory variables: 
DUM1 =1, if bidder is "white knight" under HHW process. 
= 0 otherwise. 
DUM2 =1, if bidder is the first hostile bidder. 
= 0 otherwise. 
COM, OP, DEQ. 
Dependent variable: 
CAR = two day market adjusted mean cumulative abnormal 
return for the bidding firm ending on the date of 
its first bid. 
MODEL: 
CAR = a + a1*DUM1 + a2*DUM2 + B^COM + B2*OP + B3*DEQ + e 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT 
ESTIMATOR 
CONSTANT a 
DUM1 ai 
dum2 a2 
COM b1 
OP b2 
DEQ b3 
Adjusted R2 = 0.27 
F(5f88)= 8.032** 
a=0.01. 
VALUE 
0.0458 
0.0278 
0.0326 
0.0001 
0.0181 
0.0017 
t-STATISTIC 
- 6.40** 
2.20** 
_ ** 
3.20 
0.55 
_ „ ** 
4.23 
0.45 
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monitoring disincentive variables. From the Chow test, the 
null hypothesis of no difference between the three groups is 
rejected. We accordingly construct two dummy variables to 
represent the HHW WK and the HB. The model is specified in 
Table 18 (on previous page). 
From Table 18, we note that the regression has a 
significant F-statistic, implying that the null hypothesis 
of all the coefficients being zero is rejected. There is a 
significant negative intercept, implying that the non-HHW WK 
will have a negative two day CAR. This negative CAR will be 
significantly reduced if the bidder is the WK under the HHW 
market process, or if it is the first HB bid. Once again, 
the HHW WKs and HBs seem to affect the dependent variable in 
a similar manner, significantly different from the 2 day CAR 
for the non-HHW WK.16 The coefficient of the constructed 
variable OP is positive and significant, while the 
coefficients for COM and DEQ are positive and insignificant. 
This implies that the market perceives managers to be 
perhaps motivated more by incentives related to the near 
term future horizon (OP) than by the incentive situation in 
the present (COM), or monitoring disincentives (DEQ), and 
this is reflected in a significantly higher positive (or 
lower negative) CAR with an increase in OP. The significant 
relationship between OP and CAR also shows that in the 
absence of relatively high stock option holdings by 
managers, as exists for WKs (from table 11), the market 
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might perceive an acquisition attempt by the late bidder as 
an effort to diversify the employment risk of managers, and 
thus react more negatively to such a move. A relatively 
higher value of OP, as exists for HBs and HHW WKs, will 
reduce the propensity of managers for diversifying 
employment risk through firm enlargement and encourage risk 
taking for firm value maximization. 
The model as described in Table 18 is investigated for 
heteroskedasticity using White's test. The test yields a 
test statistic of 17.84 for 26 degrees of freedom. A 
comparison with the chi-square distribution fails to reject 
the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. 
Summarizing, the T-tests reveal similarities in 
constructed variables between the HHW WKs and the HBs, and 
differences in constructed variables between HHW WKs and HBs 
on the one hand and non-HHW WKs on the other. The variable 
COM is significantly higher for the HHW WKs as compared to 
the non-HHW WKs. The Chow test and the results of the 
regression reinforce the view that the classification of 
bidders into HBs, HHW WKs and non-HHW WKs is valid as it 
differentially explains the two day CAR ending on the date 
of the first bid. The variable OP is observed to 
significantly explain the variation in CAR. Though the 
signs of the coefficients COM and DEQ are positive as 
expected, they are not found to be significant in explaining 
the two day CAR ending on the date of the first bid. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. There are eight instances of preemptive acquirers of 
targets expecting to be in play, of which only three 
are public companies. In all these cases, the acquirers 
are successful in acquiring targets. CARs during the 
preemptive offer are found to be positive in all cases, 
in conformity with the CAR profile observed for 
friendly acquisitions. 
2. Two of the contests are actually four party contests, 
with two HBs in each case. In the first case, the 
first HB is an OTC firm, and is hence excluded from the 
analysis. In the second case, the second HB is not 
considered in the analysis. However, the WKs in both 
the instances are treated as HHW WKs in terms of the 
definition in Chapter 3. 
3. Of the 62 WKs in the sample, 52 firms are successful in 
acquiring the respective target firm. In ten contests, 
the WK fails to prevail. In four of these contests, the 
HB prevails by overbidding the WK. In the other six 
contests, the target is finally acquired by a third 
bidder (which is another WK in two of these contests). 
It is noteworthy that once the target is in play, it 
ultimately ceases to exist as an independent entity in 
all the 62 contests, irrespective of the success or 
failure of the first WK in its acquisition efforts. 
4. For the WKs which fail to prevail, events beyond the 
date of withdrawal of the WK are not considered in the 
study, since the participation of the WK determines the 
span of interest in the contests studied. In these 
situations, D3 indicates the subsequent bid by the 
hostile bidder, and D4 indicates withdrawal by the WK. 
In instances where the unsuccessful WK withdrew before 
the subsequent sequential bid of the first bidder, D3 
and D4 are defined to coincide on the date of 
withdrawal of the WK from the contest. Thus, by 
construction, D3 is designed either to precede or to 
coincide with D4. For the successful WKs, the actual 
acquisition is completed on D4, though the outcome of 
the auction is public knowledge on D3. 
5. (D2+1,D1') represents the interval between each 
sequence WH, and (D1,,+1,D2') represents the interval 
between each subsequent sequence HW after the first HW. 
(D2,,+1,D3) represents the interval between the last WK 
bid and HB withdrawal. These intervals are thus 
related through the identity: 
(D2+l, D3) = (D2+l, D1 ■ ■) + (D, • *+l, D2') + (D2"+1, D3) 
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6. English auctions assume that the value of the item 
being sold does not change during the duration of the 
auction. The short length of the auction process 
relative to the length of the control contest makes it 
less likely that the value of the target firm will 
change significantly during the auction period. 
7. If the WK bid signals poor management abilities, and 
the antitakeover strategy fails owing to the inability 
of the WK to prevail and acquire the target, then the 
WK could likely become the target of future bids by 
others. A case in point is Gulf Oil Corp., which lost 
approx. 1 billion dollars in equity value over two days 
when it announced that it was going to be the WK in the 
takeover defense of Cities Service against the hostile 
bid of Mesa Petroleum in June, 1982. That acquisition 
fell through on anti-trust grounds. In February 1984, 
Gulf Oil Corp. was itself the target of a hostile 
takeover bid by Mesa Petroleum, and was acquired by a 
WK, Standard Oil Co. of California (Chevron). 
8. In fact, there is only one instance where the CAR for 
(D2-l, D2) was positive and significant. The event 
occurred in 1987 when Dow Chemical Corp. was the WK 
acquiring La Maur Inc. against the hostile bid of 
Alberto-Culver Co. 
9. While the HB sample is not representative of all 
hostile bidders, since it is a secondary sample derived 
from the WK sample, the returns pattern here is 
observed to conform more to the earlier work on bidder 
returns, reviewed in Jensen and Ruback (1983), than to 
the more recent work reviewed in Black (1989). 
10. We are aware of the small size of the HHW sub-sample 
(and the ASB sub-sample discussed in section 5.1.6) and 
its consequences for hypothesis testing. Yet, we feel 
confident regarding our inferences, based on the 
magnitude of the relative CARs and the absence of 
inconsistencies in our results. 
11. This percentage is comparable to the 60% negative 
CARs among HBs for the two days prior to their first 
bid at D1. 
12. The deferment is only for a short term, as opposed to 
other longer term contingent forms of remuneration like 
retirement benefits. 
13. With higher values of DEQ, managers will be operating 
under a high financial risk. They might have a 
propensity to undertake suboptimal investments such as 
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risky-asset substitution on behalf of their 
stockholders, since the stockholders would loose 
relatively little in the event of default on debt. 
Here, the managers are acting in the best interests of 
the stockholders; yet agency conflict between 
stockholders and bondholders can cause reduction in the 
value of the firm. Bondholders are aware of this 
possibility, and employ monitoring mechanisms to 
prevent its occurrence. (See, Myers, 1977; Smith and 
Warner, 1979). 
14. It may be noted that the variable MGR defined in 
chapter 3 is unable to discriminate between the HHW WKs 
and the non-HHW WKs. 
15. The Wilcoxon test shows that the DEQ for the hostile 
bidders is significantly higher than the DEQ for "White 
Knights" under the HHW process. This result, along 
with the subsequent result in Table 15 that the DEQ for 
hostile bidders is significantly higher than the DEQ 
for "White Knights" under the non-HHW process, seems to 
indicate that hostile bidders generally have higher 
relative levels of debt as compared to "White Knights". 
This implies a greater probability of outside 
monitoring of managerial actions for hostile bidders, 
and a corresponding disincentive for these managers to 
make bids that may be construed as non firm value 
maximizing. 
16. The regression is also run by creating dummies for HHW 
and non-HHW WKs. While the dummy for the non-HHW WK has 
a significant coefficient to demonstrate its difference 
from the HB, the dummy for the HHW WK has a coefficient 
that is not significant, implying the inability of the 
regression to distinguish between HHW WK and HB in 
explaining two day CARs. 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Summary of Findings of the Study 
The results obtained in this dissertation show that not 
all WK acquisitions are wealth reducing transactions. The 
negative perception of the market toward the WK seems to be 
a function of the sequence of bidding in the contest, and is 
considerably more ambivalent under the HHW market process 
where the WK bid follows two successive bids by the same HB. 
The market-adjusted mean cumulative abnormal return for the 
HHW WKs over the entire period of the contest is not 
significant. On the other hand, empirical evidence shows 
that the non-HHW WK bids have a greater likelihood of being 
wealth reducing. In the ASB market process where the WK 
engages in sequential bidding with the HB after its first 
bid, each successive bid of the WK is observed to be a 
wealth reducing transaction. 
The overall behavior of the WKs, though significantly 
different from the control group of HBs, is certainly not 
homogeneous. The wealth reduction involved when the HHW WKs 
make their bid does seem to be at variance with the wealth 
increasing bids of the control group of HBs. Yet, the 
extent of wealth reduction for these WKs during their bid is 
significantly less than that of non-HHW WKs during the bid, 
and as a further contrast, insignificant over the entire 
control contest. This pattern for HHW WKs is thus more in 
conformity with the distribution of bidder returns as 
observed in recent studies and summarized in Black (1989). 
It is possible that the varying investor reaction to the 
bids of the HHW WKs, when compared to the bids of the HBs is 
a consequence of the subsequent nature of WK bids. In 
contrast, the negative market reaction to bids by non-HHW 
WKs, which is much more pervasive, large in economic 
magnitudes, and increasing in size over the length of the 
contest, is more likely t be ascribable to manager 
motivations leading to a possible divergence from the goal 
of firm value maximization. 
Empirical analysis of market data on WKs thus prompt us 
to investigate the market process based segmentation of WKs 
into HHW WKs and non-HHW WKs as a reflection of the manager 
motivations involved in making the bids. Perhaps, the 
managers of HHW WKs desire to act in a firm value maximizing 
manner, but being subsequent bidders, are just afflicted 
with hubris or the winner's curse. Several of these WKs 
even have wealth increasing bids, indicating their success 
in eliminating the winner's curse. In comparison, the 
widespread and economically larger wealth reducing actions 
of the managers of the non-HHW WKs seem to be planned in 
advance, perhaps because of the availability of free cash 
flow and/or an urge to maximize growth of their firm. 
In Chapter 1, we suggest that overpayments by bidding 
firms may occur because of two reasons: 
(i) firm-value maximizing behavior by managers, and hubris 
or "winner's curse" arising out of the bidding process 
in acquisitions. 
(ii) non firm-value maximizing behavior by managers due to 
incentive misalignment resulting in agency conflicts 
with stockholders, or availability of "free" cash flow 
encouraging size maximization through acquisitions. 
We further submit that for WKs, whether the 
overpayments are due to (i) or (ii) above will depend on the 
position of the WK in the bidding queue. If the WK enters 
the bidding after two bids by the HB (an HHW market 
process), it is likely that they have made their bid on the 
basis of more information (including that contained in the 
second bid of the HB). They will also likely have appraised 
the target more thoroughly, as proxied by a greater length 
of time between their bid and the preceding bid of the HB. 
This results in the observed negative CAR during their bid 
and the proportion of negative CARs in their portfolio being 
considerably smaller than that for WKs under the non-HHW 
market process. The overpayments, being small, may be 
ascribed to hubris or the winner's curse in the context of 
the firm wealth maximizing intentions of the managers. An 
implication of this result is the absence of any intrinsic 
difference between the managerial objectives of HHW WKs and 
HBs in maximizing the value of the firm. 
Much stronger negative market reactions to WKs 
participating in the non-HHW market processes indicate the 
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market's apprehension of non-firm value maximizing behavior 
by the managers of these WKs. Our estimate of the market's 
view in this regard is further supported when examining the 
subsequent bidding behavior of HBs and WKs in ASB market 
processes, which are a subset of the non-HHW market process. 
Subsequent bids by HBs under the ASB market process do not 
elicit any negative market response, since HB managers are 
assumed to be firm-value maximizing. However, each 
subsequent bid by the ASB WKs is always met with a strong 
negative market reaction, implying that these managers may 
not be maximizing firm value through their proposed 
acquisition. Since practically all the ASB WKs are non-HHW 
WKs as well, it is feasible that managers of non-HHW WKs in 
general have intrinsically different goals relative to the 
managers of HHW WKs and HBs, leading to non firm value 
maximizing behavior. 
We feel that on an ex-ante basis, managerial motivation 
for firm-value maximization can be evaluated by measuring 
the direct incentive effects associated with the proportion 
of stock and stock options in the compensation structure of 
managers. However, from existing econometric evidence 
(detailed in Chapter 2), the proportion of cash income in 
the compensation is an incentive for growth or size 
maximization. An appropriate ratio of these two factors in 
the compensation may thus enable us to evaluate, on a 
comparative basis, the relative impact on managerial 
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behavior of the incentives for firm value maximization and 
size maximization. In addition, external monitoring of 
manager compliance with the goal of firm-value maximization 
can limit deviations due to agency conflicts. It may be 
noted in this regard that despite its obvious advantages in 
eliminating agency conflicts, it is not possible to pay 
managers their entire compensation in the form of stock and 
stock options, for reasons mentioned in Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) and summarized in Chapter 2. Accordingly, we 
construct two incentive variables and one monitoring 
variable to incorporate the divergent incentive implications 
of stock/stock options and cash income, and consider the 
effectiveness of monitoring. The incentive variables are 
the income equivalent of managerial stockholding (COM) and 
the income equivalent of managerial holding of executive 
stock options (OP), both relative to the annual cash and 
cash-equivalent income of the managers. The monitoring 
variable is the level of firm debt (DEQ) relative to the 
market value of firm equity. From the investor reaction to 
bidding behavior reviewed earlier, we would expect COM, OP 
and DEQ for the firm value maximizing HBs and HHW WKs to be 
higher, because of the relatively greater proportion of 
stock and stock options directing the incentives toward firm 
value maximizing behavior, and the effectiveness of 
monitoring in these situations. On the contrary, values of 
COM, OP and DEQ are likely to be lower for non-HHW WKs 
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because of the relatively greater role of cash income in 
channelizing incentives toward growth or size maximizing 
behavior. The results of our analysis are summarized below 
(where the subscripts indicate the group to which the 
variable belongs, and the notation « indicates the inability 
of the tests to distinguish between the two groups): 
Incentive Variables 
COM 1 OP 
^^HHU > COMN0N-HHW 0PHHW 
~ OP 
WiNON-HHU 
comhb > COMnqn-hhw 0PHB > OP wrNON-HHU 
comhhu * comhb 0PHHW “ 0PHB 
comasb « COMnon-asb ®PASB 
~ OP 
wrNON-ASB 
i 
According to the Wilcoxon test, 0PHB « °pnon-hhu 
Monitoring Variable 
DEQ 
DEQhhw ~ deqnon -HHW 
DEQhb > deQnon-hhu 
deQhhw ~ DEQHB 
DEQasb « DEQnon -ASB 
According to the Wilcoxon test, DEQHB > DEQHHW. 
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The above results provide direct evidence that 
differences in WKs based on their position in the sequence 
of bidding (upto their first bid) in corporate control 
contests indeed reflect the varying incentives motivating 
the managers. While such incentive alignments are not 
readily observable, varying investor reaction to the bids by 
the two categories of WKs indicates the market's 
differential perception of the objectives of the respective 
managers. This is additionally confirmed by the results of 
the Chow test, which show that there are structural 
differences between the non-HHW WKs and the HHW WKs (and the 
HBs) in explaining the two day CAR ending on the date of the 
first bid. The use of dummies by two of the groups in a 
regression shows that the market perception of bids by HHW 
WKs and HBs is statistically indistinguishable. However, 
the reaction to bids by non-HHW WKs is significantly more 
negative. 
We can thus conclude that based on the significantly 
higher value for the incentive variable COM for HHW WKs 
relative to non-HHW WKs, the significantly higher values for 
all the incentive and monitoring variables of HBs as 
compared to non-HHW WKs, and the inability of the tests to 
find any difference between these variables for HHW WKs and 
HBs, managers of HBs and HHW WKs are more likely to be firm- 
value maximizers. Negative market reactions to their bids, 
as observed from time to time for a large section of these 
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firms, could reasonably be ascribed to affliction with 
hubris or the "winner's curse". However, the significantly 
lower values of COM, OP and DEQ for non-HHW WKs indicate 
that their managers are less likely to be firm value 
maximizers. The preponderance of negative market reaction 
to their bids implies that non firm value maximizing 
hypotheses like size maximization or "free" cash flow may be 
motivating the bids of these non-HHW WKs. Incidentally, it 
is clear from the results that the incentive alignments of 
the managers are reflected only in their first bid. 
Subsequent bids by the WK (captured by the ASB process) 
presumably follow the same managerial motivations and can 
therefore not be distinguished through the defined variables 
COM, OP and DEQ. 
6.2 Further Implications 
The results obtained for the variable COM are directly 
consistent across the three groups of HBs, HHW WKs and non- 
HHW WKs, and are supported by both the parametric and non- 
parametric tests. However, the inferences regarding the 
ability of OP and DEQ to differentiate between the relative 
groups are weaker, being not inconsistent across the groups. 
In particular, our theory requires that for the variables OP 
and DEQ, the relevant statistical test provide evidence of a 
significant difference between the measure of central 
tendency for the HHW and non-HHW WKs. However, the tests, 
which are structured on the null hypothesis of equality 
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among groups, are observed not to be powerful enough to 
reject the null at the required level of confidence. In 
addition, the parametric and non-parametric tests do not 
yield identical results for these variables. While we have 
based our general inferences regarding OP and DEQ on the 
results of the t-test between pairs of groups, the lack of 
support from the Wilcoxon test does make the evidence 
weaker. However, the non-parametric results also provide 
some interesting insights regarding these variables. 
In respect of the variable OP, the inability of the 
Wilcoxon test to distinguish between HBs and non-HHW WKs may 
additionally provide weak evidence that OP is not different 
for any of the three groups. If OP is considered to be a 
proxy for the business risk propensity of managers, then it 
is possible to envisage that apriori, the distribution of 
risk aversion is not significantly different across the 
three groups of HHW WKs, non-HHW WKs and HBs. However, in 
preference to the variable COM which reflects the existing 
managerial incentives, the market seems to price the 
acquisition bid (through the two day CARs) on the expected 
incentive alignments of managers in the near term future 
(through the variable OP). This can be said to indicate the 
market's view that current managerial behavior is more 
likely to be governed by the incentive expectations of the 
managers in the near-term horizon. 
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The significant impact of OP on CAR is in addition to 
the separate, significant impact on CAR of dummy variables 
representing the three groups of HHW WKs, non-HHW WKs and 
HBs. The variable COM is a reflection, in part, of the 
variable OP in the past, through the exercise of stock 
options by managers. To this extent, its influence on 
managerial action is likely to have been directly priced by 
the market in the past on a prospective basis, and firms 
categorized at the prevailing time as value maximizers or 
otherwise based on their incentive configurations. The 
market is thus likely to be somewhat aware during the bid, 
from past information on OP values, of the group to which 
the firm belongs. This additional information causes the 
market to discriminate against the non-HHW WK through a 
negative CAR, in addition to the current linear impact of OP 
on CAR. 
Summarizing, the market apriori reacts negatively to 
the bid by the group of non-HHW WKs, which can be 
distinguished from the other groups by a significantly 
smaller value of the variable COM. Additionally, managers 
with a higher value of OP during their bid are considered by 
the market to be motivated to undertake normal business risk 
for direct executive stock option benefits in the near-term 
horizon. The acquisition activity of these managers is 
viewed by the market more positively since it is considered 
to be firm value maximizing. Managers with a low value of OP 
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are not likely to have the same incentive alignment for 
taking normal business risk and maximizing their near-term 
utility. For them, the investors may evaluate acquisition 
activity as an effort to diversify employment risk, causing 
a strong negative market reaction, since the action 
accentuates agency conflicts. 
For the monitoring effectiveness variable DEQ, the 
Wilcoxon test indicates that the variable has a lower value 
for both HHW WKs and non-HHW WKs relative to HBs. While 
there is little doubt that the high DEQ for HBs is an 
indication of monitoring effectiveness for value maximizing 
behavior, it is also feasible that lower monitoring makes it 
somewhat easier for WKs to come in with subsequent bids in 
relative haste. Thus, while monitoring may not play a 
direct role in distinguishing between the HHW WKs and non- 
HHW WKs, ex-ante managerial incentives, in themselves, cause 
the HHW WKs to be more like HBs. We do not find evidence 
that the market directly prices effectiveness of monitoring 
through a significant impact on the two day CAR, though the 
sign is positive as expected. 
6.3 Contribution of the Study 
We feel that the dissertation makes a number of 
important contributions to the existing body of knowledge in 
the fields of mergers and acquisitions, agency theory, and 
compensation structures. It is the first study to 
simultaneously assess the impact of two bidders in the same 
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contest for control of a target's assets when one is hostile 
and the other is friendly. For the set of late entry 
friendly bidders in these hostile takeover contests, called 
"white knights" (WKs), the study is again the first to 
establish the differential nature of WK behavior based on 
their position in the bidding queue. In general, the HB bid 
is followed by a WK bid leading to a WK acquisition of the 
target firm. However, one group of WKs is observed to 
follow a different market process, called the HHW market 
process, in as much as it enters the bidding only after the 
hostile bidder has made a second higher bid for the target 
firm on rejection of its first bid. The market reaction to 
bids by this category of bidders is radically different from 
the market reaction to the complementary set of WKs. Another 
group of WKs is observed to follow a market process called 
the ASB market process where the HB and the WK alternate in 
bidding with successively higher bids till the WK wins the 
contest. The market reaction here is an accumulation of the 
reaction to single WK bids. Thus, we can make a partition 
of the sample of bidders in corporate control contests 
involving two or more bidders, with each bidder having a 
different approach to the acquisition of the same target 
firm, based on 
(i) the inclination of the bidder, i.e. hostile or friendly 
(ii) the timing and sequence of bidding by the hostile and 
friendly bidders in the acquisition process. 
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Our hypothesized market reactions for these different 
categories of bidders, based on insights from auction 
theory, is supported by the empirical evidence. This enables 
us to make inferences regarding the possible firm value 
maximizing motivation of the managers of the WK firms. 
The design of the study provides an added benefit in 
that there is an inherent control in the form of the HB bid 
with which the different categories of WK bids can be 
compared. Subsequent HB bids can also be compared with 
subsequent WK bids under the ASB market process. In the 
absence of any systematic size or industry based biases in 
the selection of the hostile bidder and the WK, the use of 
the HB as the control is effective and appropriate in 
distinguishing market reaction to bids based on the status 
of the bidder (friendly or hostile) and the sequence of 
bidding. 
Investor response to bidding behavior shows that there 
is a significant difference in reactions depending upon who 
makes the bid, the HB or the WK. When the WK makes the bid, 
the reaction to the HHW WK differs from the reaction to the 
non-HHW WK. Overall, the response to WK bids is strongly 
negative, indicating that managers of some WKs may not 
always be acting in the best interests of the stockholders. 
The response to the bids by HHW WKs is weakly negative, more 
in conformity with the response to bids by HBs, leading us 
to believe that the point of entry of the WK in the bidding 
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process (HHW or non-HHW) may indeed be the critical factor 
discriminating between WK manager motivations. 
We believe that in the first instance, manager 
motivations to maximize stockholder wealth will be governed 
by the incentive alignments in their compensation packages, 
to reduce the potential agency conflict between the 
stockholders (principals) and their agents (managers). In 
addition, a disincentive to managers from engaging in 
activity where there could be a potential conflict of 
interest with the stockholders, can come from monitoring of 
their activity, which increases with the existence of debt. 
Thus, the creation of incentives for managers to engage in 
maximization of firm value originates from the stockholders, 
and the effectiveness of monitoring to discourage managers 
from deviating from the goal of firm-value maximization 
usually originates from the bondholders through bond 
covenants. 
In its success in defining and measuring these 
incentive and monitoring variables through appropriate 
proxies, and showing how these proxy variables are 
significantly different for the different groups of WKs and 
HBs based on bidding behavior, this study contributes to the 
literature on agency theory. For the first time, to our 
knowledge, compensation structures of managers are divided 
into a firm value maximizing incentive component (the income 
equivalent of direct and beneficial ownership of stock and 
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stock options by managers) and a size-maximizing cash 
component, and the ratio of the two considered to be the 
appropriate measure of the incentive alignment of managers. 
Stock options are examined separately as their valuation 
additionally incorporates the extent of riskiness involved 
in managerial activity. Monitoring effectiveness is proxied 
by a variant of the debt-equity ratio. We find evidence that 
the incentive and monitoring variables are higher for HHW 
WKs and HBs, which indicates that possible overpayment by 
the managers of these firms may be due to reasons consistent 
with firm value maximization. On the contrary, managers of 
non-HHW WK firms have greater incentives to increase size 
and diversify employment risk due to the lower proportion of 
stock and stock options relative to cash and cash-equivalent 
compensation in their compensation packages. 
The results of the study thus establish that managerial 
ownership of firm stock is only one aspect of the incentive 
structure of the manager. For a complete analysis, the cash 
compensation of the manager, which motivates him/her to 
increase size and provides little incentive to maximize firm 
value, also needs to be considered. The ratios defined by 
us to measure incentives incorporate both these effects. 
In addition, the ratio pertaining to executive stock options 
has a strong positive relationship with the CAR in the 
market model at the time of the bid. This ratio can be said 
to measure managerial propensity to take normal business 
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risk for firm value maximization. Firms whose managers may 
prefer to diversify their employment risk through size 
maximization, since there is relatively less incentive for 
assuming normal business risk owing to lower holding of 
stock options, are penalized by the market through larger 
negative excess returns. Thus, the incentive structure of 
managers is directly linked to managerial activity observed 
in bidding behavior. In a broader context, this approach 
makes it possible to study the impact of incentives on the 
activities of managers involved in acquisition decisions. 
We consider the dissertation to be conceptually broad 
based for the purpose of studying the behavior of late entry 
collaborative bidding firms in corporate control contests. 
However, our research results and inferences therefrom are 
limited by the approximations necessary to standardize the 
compensation/beneficial ownership data on managers available 
from the proxy statements, as detailed in Chapter 4. 
6.4 Avenues for Further Research 
A number of additional hypotheses can be generated and 
tested relating to the partitioning based on timing and 
sequence of the WK bid. A study of premiums offered over 
preceding bids is likely to reveal a significantly lower 
premium offered by HHW WKs over the preceding bid, as 
compared to non-HHW WKs. In the context of the ASB market 
process, these premiums over preceding bids should be higher 
for the subsequent WK bids than for the subsequent HB bids. 
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A study of the cash and stock components of each bid will 
likely establish a lower proportion of cash in HHW WK bids 
and HB bids. However, the method of payment in WK bids may 
also be influenced by the method of payment offered by the 
HB which is the first bidder. A larger share of cash in 
non-HHW WK bids will also indicate the use of the strategy 
as an antitakeover device by these WKs, to enable them to 
become less attractive as takeover targets and hence less 
susceptible to the disciplining mechanism of hostile 
takeovers. 
Three avenues have been identified by researchers as 
preventing managers from pursuing objectives divergent from 
firm value maximization (see chapter 3): 
(i) The managerial labor market, which, if efficient, will 
penalize non firm value maximizing managers through a 
reduction in their intrinsic value. 
(ii) Direct provision of suitable incentives to managers in 
their compensation packages to motivate actions 
maximizing firm value. 
(iii) Monitoring mechanisms as direct disincentives to non 
firm value maximizing behavior by managers: 
(a) Internal monitoring, arising out of the existence 
of bond covenants. 
(b) External monitoring, through the disciplining 
mechanism of the hostile takeover. 
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With regard to (i) above, the efficiency of the managerial 
labor market has not been established. It is also extremely 
difficult to price human capital and measure value changes 
in human capital. So, the managerial labor market is a non- 
sequitur, as a practical matter. In our study, we have shown 
the effectiveness of (ii) and [iii(a)] above as strategies 
to motivate managers to undertake firm value maximizing 
actions. A larger proportion of cash in bids by non-HHW WKs 
will indirectly indicate the effectiveness of [iii(b)], as 
the actions of these managers can be interpreted as an 
attempt to evade the disciplining mechanism of the hostile 
takeover by making their firm less attractive as a target. 
Corporate control contests involving WKs provide an 
opportunity to study value transfers between firms and the 
economic welfare consequences of such transfers. Existing 
studies on wealth transfers have divided contestants into 
two categories, viz. the bidders and the targets, and noted 
dollar gains in equity values for both categories. However, 
in the limited context of control contexts involving WKs, 
there is no doubt that a large number of WKs incur 
significant dollar losses. An estimate of such dollar 
losses, and its comparison with dollar gains by targets and 
possible gains by hostile bidders, can yield interesting 
inferences regarding value transfers between contestants in 
hostile takeover bids involving "white knights". 
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Finally, this dissertation highlights the difference in 
agency relationships between the managers and stockholders 
of the HHW WKs, non-HHW WKs and HBs. Managers of HBs and HHW 
WKs are said to be firm value maximizers since the income 
equivalent of stock and stock options play a greater role in 
their incentives relative to cash income. On the other 
hand, the incentives of managers of non-HHW WKs are 
dominated by cash compensation. A principal premise of the 
dissertation is that actions of the managers, including 
acquisition activity, are likely to be a reflection of their 
ex-ante incentive alignments. Accordingly, the relative 
compensation factors most influencing managerial behavior 
should increase, ex-post, after the activity has been 
undertaken, for the manager to maximize his/her utility. 
Thus, for the non-HHW WK firms, there should be a 
significant increase in annual cash income after the 
acquisition. For the managers of HHW WKs or HBs, the result 
of successful acquisition activity should be a higher 
proportion of stock and stock options. This can be easily 
tested for individual managers through a scrutiny of the 
change in their stock holdings and compensation of through 
the control contest. 
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